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GATT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A
FORMULA FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Frederick M. Abbott *
INTRODUCTION

In a dark corner of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations lurks
a fundamental issue of international trade relations unlikely to find a
peaceful resolution either at the completion of the Round or soon
thereafter. It is clear that through the middle of 1990 scant attention
was paid to the relationship which would exist between the GATT and
the European Community ("EC"), or the GATT and any other regional group, subsequent to the incorporation of the so-called "new
areas" into the GATT regime, and with respect to the scope of preferential arrangements or discriminations that these regional trading arrangements ("RTAs") might be allowed.' Yet as the Community
completes its much-heralded 1992 plan2 and the Heads of State of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. University of California,
Berkeley, B.A. (1974); Yale Law School, J.D. (1977); University of California, Berkeley, LL.M.
(1989).
The author wishes to thank Professors David Gerber, Meinhard Hilf, Robert Hudec and
Stefan Riesenfeld, and Judge Thijmen Koopmans of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (formerly of the European Court of Justice) for sharing their views on various aspects of the subject
matter of this article, and for providing comments on a draft which were of great value to the
author in its completion.
The author also wishes to express his appreciation to the people of the GATT and the European Communities Commission for making themselves available for open discussion concerning
the subject matter of this article. The author especially wishes to thank Mr. Frieder Roessler of
the GATT and Ms. Alison Birkett and Mr. Nicholas Costello of the EC Telecommunications
Directorate for their views. Janis Marzuki, the author's research assistant, was very helpful in
collecting documentary sources.
1. As will be elaborated in this article, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to
regional trading arrangements in the GATT framework with respect to the GATT's historic role
in regulating world trade in goods. See Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GAT.
The Legacy of a Misconception, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1963); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 211-26 (2d ed. 1990); J. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 141-43 (1989); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 575623 (1969) [hereinafter LAW OF GATT]; FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (J.
Schott ed. 1989). Particularly with respect to the pre-Uruguay Round relationship between the
European Community and the GATT, see THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT (M. Hilf,
F. Jacobs & E. Petersmann eds. 1986) [hereinafter EC AND GATT]. An excellent critique of the
GATT treatment of regional trading arrangements which suggests reexamining the existing legal
mechanism is in Cottier, Die Bedeutung des GA TT im ProzeB der europaischen Integration, EGRECHT UND SCHWEIZERISCHE RECHTSORDNUNG (0. Jacot-Guillarmod, D. Schindler & T. Cottier eds. 1990).
2. With respect to the implementation of the EC's 1992 plan to complete the internal market,
see, e.g., Ninth Annual Symposium on International Legal Practice, Europe: 1992, 13 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371 (1990); Stein, Panel Discussion: Europe 1992, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
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Western Hemisphere become increasingly enamored of the free trade
area as a solution to stagnant economic development, 3 some light
might well be shined into this dark corner lest the concept of the liberal international trading system embodied in the GATT be inadvertently annihilated.
The current round of international trade negotiations under
GATT 4 auspices is designed in large measure to bring trade in services, investment measures and intellectual property rights protection
within the framework of GATT regulation. 5 Developments in the international economy make the GATT somewhat anachronistic in that
it concerns itself only with the trade of goods, while a large portion of
international economic flows are made up of services, the sale and
transfer of intangible technologies and direct investment. 6 Many years
525 (1990); 1992: THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (Bi-Weekly News for

Business and Government).
3. Reported proposals range from the modest bilateral free trade area between the United
States and Mexico or Chile, to a North American FTA including the United States, Canada and
Mexico, to an arrangement incorporating the entire hemisphere (see, e.g., President Announces
Plan for More Latin Debt Relief, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1990, at Dl, col. I (President Bush
proposes creation of free trade zone for hemisphere); US. and Mexico Cautiously Back FreeTrade Area, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (U.S.-Mexico agreement in principle to
negotiate comprehensive free trade agreement); Chile and U.S. to Begin Talks on Freeing Trade,
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1990, at D8, col. 5 (United States and Chile to open negotiations to establish
free trade area); Canada-US.Subsidy Talks, Uruguay Round Doomed to Failure,Canadian NegotiatorSays, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 481 (Apr. 4, 1990) (Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney
hints that Mexico could soon be added to U.S.-Canada FTA)).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The "GATT" is commonly used to refer both to an international organization [hereinafter "GATT"] and to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[hereinafter "General Agreement"], which is its charter document. The history of the GATT is
so well-chronicled and its operations so extensively analyzed that these undertakings will not be
repeated in this article except as specifically relevant to its subject matter. Primary sources for
description and analysis of the GATT are R. HUDEC, supra note 1, J. JACKSON, supra note 1,
LAW OF GATT, supra note 1 and EC AND GATT, supra note 1; K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA,

IMPLEMENTING

THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

TIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984); 0.

AND INTERNA-

LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT

(1985).
5. For a general discussion of the issues under negotiation in the Uruguay Round, see THE

MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM

NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (E. Petersmann & M. Hilfeds.
1988) [hereinafter NEW GATT ROUND]; THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (J. Finger & A. Olechowski eds. 1987). On trade in

services (or GATS), see Krommenacker, MultilateralServices Negotiations: From Interest-Lateralism to Reasoned Multilateralism in the Context of the Servicization of the Economy, in NEW
GATT ROUND, supra, at 455. On trade-related investment measures (or TRIMS), see Ellis,
Trade-Related Investment Measures in the Uruguay Round, in CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN

US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 273 (S. Rubin & M. Jones eds. 1989). On trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights ("TRIPS"), see Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989).

6. The motivating factors behind the Uruguay Round of negotiations are varied and complex. This article will focus on certain substantive aspects of these negotiations specifically related to trade in services and the telecommunications sector for reasons elaborated infra at text
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and much effort have been spent to reconcile the GATT with international trade reality, and there are good prospects for at least limited
success. Moreover, even if the Uruguay Round negotiations should
fail as a whole (crashing on the shoals of agricultural subsidies perhaps), the major international trading powers may well reach an accommodation on the problem of liberalizing cross-border trade in
7
services.
This article addresses the relationship between the GATT, the European Community and other RTAs as and when trade in services and
other "new areas" are incorporated into the GATT framework. The
article first discusses the conceptual justifications for RTAs (as an alternative to utopian global free trade) in order to provide background
for considering whether the privileges accorded RTAs under the existing GATT framework should be extended to new areas and, if so,
how far. It is observed that "state of the art" tools of economic analysis do not provide adequate guidance as to the global welfare costs or
benefits of RTAs so as to enable trade policy-makers to determine in
advance their impact on global welfare, and that more subjective
modes of analysis must be looked to for answers. The article then
describes the GATT's historic tolerance of RTAs and how that tolerance is legislatively embodied in the General Agreement. It is noted
that the existing (and controversial) formula providing a limited
waiver for RTAs with respect to the GATT Most Favored Nation
("MFN") principle (and trade in goods) cannot be readily transported
and applied to the National Treatment principle and trade in services
(with which the Uruguay Round negotiations are concerned). The
EC's proposal for a new RTA waiver in its draft GATT Services Code
proposal is analyzed and is found to be both unworkable and unwise.
This article proposes a new formula for a GATT waiver or exemption
which would be applicable to the EC and other RTAs. The new
formula would rely on the concept of "necessity" as a basis for the
evaluation of RTA conduct which derogates from the general rules of
the GATT. While certain guideposts may be provided to decisionaccompanying note 105. A thorough discussion of the many complex issues involved in the
Uruguay Round appears in the references cited at note 5, supra.
7. As of this writing, the U.S. government is taking the very firm position that if the European Community does not make significant concessions on the elimination of agricultural subsidies, the Uruguay Round talks will fail because the United States and/or the developing
countries will not find the result worthwhile (see, e.g., Trade Talks Stalemated After U.S.-Europe
Clash, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, at D2, col. 5). The interest of the U.S. service industries in the
liberalization of major overseas markets is quite strong, on the other hand, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the Executive branch will attempt to negotiate a services liberalization
agreement in the GATT (or some other multilateral forum) regardless of the outcome of the
Round as a whole, in order to promote U.S. services exports.
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makers with respect to the application of the proposed RTA waiver
formula, it is clear that the myriad of contexts in which RTA derogations may arise will require the development of a new body (or common law) of interpretive decisions concerning RTA derogations some of which, such as RTA measures designed for the primary purpose of providing unfair comparative advantages to local industry, will
involve bright lines distinguishing the "necessary" from the "merely
convenient," and others of which will involve careful balancings of
interests.
This article then focuses specifically on the telecommunications
sector of the services trade to provide a concrete reference point or
"case study" of potential RTA discriminations. Attention is focused
on a particular RTA -

the European Community -

and its actions

both with respect to liberalizing its internal telecommunications sector
and its position in the GATT services/telecommunications negotiations. An attempt is made to apply both the EC's proposed RTA
waiver and the formula proposed in this article to prospective EC conduct in its telecommunications sector. The results of this application
illustrate the difficulties inherent in the EC formula as well as the elements of subjectivity inherent in the formula proposed in this article.
Whatever waiver formula is adopted in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the discussion in this article will hopefully serve to illuminate
the consideration of RTA actions within the new GATT framework as
the new formula is implemented.
Succinctly stated, the central issue in this article is whether RTAs
should be permitted to adopt rules which derogate from the National
Treatment principle of the GATT in the application of new agreements covering trade in services and other "new areas," and therefore
be allowed to discriminate in favor of member country enterprises for
reasons having to do with the formation or maintenance of the RTAs.
If so, by what legal standard should such derogations be evaluated?
As the article will make clear, this issue is not a mere abstraction. The
EC clearly has in mind that it will be enabled to liberalize its internal
market for the benefit of domestic service providers without extending
the benefits of that liberalization directly to non-Member State enterprises." Such discrimination would necessarily involve derogations
8. As discussed in detail infra at text accompanying notes 48-52, the following draft clause is
taken from the EC's proposal for a GATT Services Code:
Subject to the conditions [sic] that the resulting regime is on the whole no more restrictive
than that resulting from previous commitments set out in its schedule, this Agreement shall
not prevent any party from being a party to an agreement aiming at a higher degree of
liberalisation of trade in services in the framework of a customs union or free-trade area
within the meaning of Article XXIV paragraph 8 of the GATT, or to adopt an interim
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from the National Treatment principle to which parties to a new
GATT Services Code would otherwise be subject. 9
I.

REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS AT THE
CONCEPTUAL LEVEL

A.

Politics

A waiver permitting the formation of RTAs and condoning certain
RTA discriminatory practices ° was incorporated in the GATT General Agreement in 1949 because of a belief that RTAs might be economically desirable, I t and because of post-war perceptions of the
potential advantages for regional political stability which might be
achieved through economic integration. There was then and remains a
strong political/military motivation for encouraging European inteagreement leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area whose scope would
include trade in services.
Proposalby the EC: A Draft, General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 111(1), GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/105 (June 18, 1990) [hereinafter EC Services Proposal].
9. To further illustrate the Community's preoccupation with the RTA waiver issue, note that
the following clause appeared in the EC's proposal for a GATT Intellectual Property Rights
agreement:
Contracting parties which constitute a customs union or free trade area within the meaning
of Article XXIV of the General Agreement may apply to one another measures relating to
the protection of intellectual property rights without extending them to other contracting
parties, in order to facilitate trade between their territories.
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. IV, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NGI 1/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990), pt. 1.
EC officials have explained that the foregoing clause was directed at covering their so-called
"exhaustion" concept with regard to patents, and that perhaps the inclusion of the broad clause
set forth above was unnecessary. It is nevertheless illustrative of the Community's mind-set that
such a clause would have been included in a draft intellectual property rights agreement in which
the reasonable grant of discriminatory preferences is difficult to envisage.
10. The RTA exemption, article XXIV of the General Agreement, is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 30-33.
11. Jackson notes that the United States officially supported the RTA exception on the
grounds that such arrangements are desirable, with the proviso that they do "not cause any
disadvantage to outside countries, in comparison with their trade before the customs union [was]
effected." LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 577. Dam states that the drafters of the General
Agreement were faced with a conflict between the goals of multilateral tariff reduction and regional discrimination, which they sought to solve by use of a legal formula that would countenance only those RTAs which did not attempt to raise barriers to non-member trade. Dam,
supra note 1, at 622. Dam's general conclusion concerning the General Agreement's RTA
waiver provision, article XXIV, is worth repeating here:
If a single adjective were to be chosen to describe article XXIV, that adjective would be
'deceptive.' First, the standards established are deceptively concrete and precise; any attempt to apply the standards to a specific situation reveals ambiguities which, to use an
irresistible metaphor, go to the heart of the matter. Second, while the rule appears to be
carefully conceived, the principles enunciated make little economic sense. Third, the dismaying experience of the Contracting Parties has been that no customs union or free-trade
area agreement presented for review has complied with article XXIV and yet every such
agreement has been approved by a tacit or explicit waiver.
Id. at 619.
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gration in particular. 12 Then and now, these political/military motivations may outweigh all but the most compelling economic
13
arguments against an RTA like the EC.
B.

Economics

Economists, on the other hand, have not been able to provide a
definitive perspective on the welfare benefits and costs of RTAs because of their enormous complexity and dynamism. In 1950 econo4
mist Jacob Viner described the basic economic impact of the RTA,1
and his observations remain at the core of RTA economic analysis.
Viner observed that RTAs may both create trade among RTA members by shifting production and imports from higher-cost RTA members to lower-cost RTA members, and divert trade by shifting
production and imports from non-RTA member country exporters
(with former cost advantages) to member country producers/exporters awarded cost advantages by new preferences. Whether an RTA
would produce an economic welfare benefit would depend upon
whether its trade creating (i.e., new trade between the member countries) or trade diverting (i.e., member country trade which is substi12. It has been observed that:
The idea of the 'United States of Europe' . . . which would be a faithful partner of the
United States of America, could be seen behind the Marshall Plan, the American decision to
take part in the defense of Europe (the Vandenberg Resolution), and U.S. support for the
process of neofunctional integration after 1950.
Elazar & Greilsammer, Federal Democracy: The U.S.A. and Europe Compared, A Political Science Perspective, in I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 71, 88 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J.
Weiler eds. 1986).
The FIRST REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION STUDY GROUP (Mar. 1948), prepared by 14 European countries considering the formation of a customs union (with the United
States and several other countries participating as observers), concluded that it was not practicable to pronounce definitely on the advantages and disadvantages of such a union. Id. at 91, para.
217. However, the report observed:
Europe today, as a result of the upheavals caused by crises and wars, is a mosaic of
different economic systems whose dissimilarities impede the achievement of equilibrium.
Internal differences have been accentuated by the existence of traditional bonds between
certain European and overseas countries or territories and, from a very different angle, by
the distortion of European trade produced by the need to acquire hard currencies....
Nevertheless, there exists between many European countries a close interdependence
which might form the basis of an organic community.
Id. at 89, paras. 212-13. See also LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 580; Haight, Customs Unions
and Free Trade Areas under GAT, A Reappraisal, 6 J. WORLD TR. L. 391, 392 (1972).
13. The editors of INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW make the following observation about the
thinking prevalent at the formation of the Community which seems to retain its vitality today:
"[T]he trauma of World War II - which was the immediate and powerful mobilizing vehicle for
the integration movement - created, especially in the generation of the 'Founding Fathers,' a
strong commitment to European integration as a meta-value in itself above any mundane costbenefit analysis." Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler, Integration Through Law: Europe and the
American Federal Experience, A General Introduction, in I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, supra
note 12, at 6.
14. J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 41-81 (1950).
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tuted for third-country trade) forces were predominant. Though not
so assumed by Viner, t5 Dam (among others) concluded after Viner's
observations on RTA effects were published that it would be possible
to predict whether a particular RTA would, as a whole, be trade creating or trade diverting and therefore beneficial or detrimental to global

economic welfare. 16
Forty years following Viner's pathfinding work there seems to be
some consensus that predicting or even determining after the fact the
trade creating/trade diverting impact of an entire RTA is no easy matter and, moreover, that the determination of the so-called "welfare effects" of the RTA should involve an analysis of factors other than
trade effects. A recent Note prepared by the GATT Secretariat which
reviews the literature on the trade creation and trade diversion effects
of RTAs suggests that as economic analysis has become increasingly
sophisticated and the dynamic effects of market manipulating mechanisms have become better understood, the complex effects of trade barrier adjustment on local production and consumption, external
production and consumption, employment, social welfare, monetary
policy (including balance of payments effects), etc. challenge the most
sophisticated empirical and modeling capacities of the economist. Be15. Viner wrote with respect to trade creating ("TC") and trade diverting ("TD") effects:
None of these questions [of effect] can be answered a priori, and the correct answers will
depend on just how the customs union operates in practice. All that a priorianalysis can do,
is to demonstrate, within limits, how the customs union must operate, if it is to have specific
types of consequences.
Id. at 42-43.
16. It followed from this conclusion that the best legal formula for evaluating a prospective
RTA would employ at its core a determination whether the RTA was likely to generate a preponderance of trade creating or trade diverting effects. The central thesis of Dam's article on
RTAs and the GATT was that rather than using the seriously flawed tests for an RTA waiver
provided for in article XXIV, it would be more sensible to evaluate RTAs for their trade creating/trade diverting (TC/TD) effects and to make a determination "whether these effects are on
balance favorable or unfavorable for the world as a whole." Dam, supra note 1,at 627. In
Dam's optimum international economy, the prices paid by consumers are the prices received by
producers and the prices charged by producers are the prices paid by consumers - there is no
distortion in the pricing mechanism as the result of barriers such as tariffs. Dam subdivided
trade creation and trade diversion into the categories of favorable production, unfavorable production, favorable consumption and unfavorable consumption effects, and proposed certain
gauges by which such effects could be predicted (e.g., with respect to production effects, Dam
suggested that higher pre-union, inter-member tariffs would be likely to lead to more favorable
production effects upon the formation of the union). Id. at 627-28. The proposed short-form
rules for predicting the global welfare benefits of RTAs now appear to leave too much out of the
integration effects equation to be used as standards against which to evaluate them. Certain
economists have suggested somewhat more elaborate versions of Dam's short-form rules as RTA
evaluation criteria. See, e.g., Wannacott & Lutz, Is There a Casefor Free Trade Areas?, in FREE
TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1,at 59. As discussed in the text and the
following notes, however, the passage of time seems to more realistically give rise to the sanguine
conclusion that the trade creation/trade diversion effects of RTAs are a priori indeterminate
under the current state of the economic art, and that TC/TD effects are not the appropriate end
of inquiry.
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yond that, an evaluation of RTAs involves "public choice" issues
which are not answerable by economic modeling alone.' 7
Following a thorough review of economic studies with respect to
the economic impact of RTAs (including the EC) and an identification
of the more prudent and realistic of these studies, the Note observes,
inter alia, a "considerable variation" in the estimated trade creation
and trade diversion effects of the EC.' 8 The Secretariat adds that
"with few often striking exceptions ... most studies [of customs unions] have produced estimates of substantial absolute values for TC,
net TC and/or welfare gains, which nevertheless are extremely small
as percentages of national income or GNP,"1 9 and that the difficulties
encountered by leading economists in estimating after the fact the impact of the creation of an RTA "underlines the limits in the logic and
practice of ex ante prediction of TC-TD [trade creation-trade
diversion]."20
The GATT Secretariat's survey of the global economic welfare effects of RTAs suggests that there are no conclusive answers to these
key questions: (a) from a global economic welfare standpoint, are
RTAs as a general proposition good or bad? (b) from a global economic welfare standpoint, are particular RTAs good or bad? While
there are opinions on all sides of these questions, the economic costs
and benefits of RTAs appear to remain largely indeterminate at present. There does appear to be some consensus that the tools of economic analysis are not yet sufficiently developed to permit conclusive
predictions about the welfare effects of prospective RTAs.

17. A Brief Review of the Literature on Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of Regional Arrangements, Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on GATT
Articles (June 6, 1989) [hereinafter Note of GATT Secretariat]. An extensive bibliography is
appended to the Note. The Note states that the major extensions in customs union theory have
'sought to broaden the focus of Viner's analysis" by including assessment of the additional effects referred to in the text. Id. at 6, para. 11. However, the Note adds that studies of the trade
effects of tariff changes involving trade creation and trade diversion "reaffirm the feasibility of the
underlying calculus that a [Customs Union] will increase overall world welfare if it created more
trade than it diverted." Id. at 11, para 20.
18. Id. at 13, para. 24.
19. Id. The Note refers to one economist's conclusion that because of certain studies which
exceptionally suggested a large trade creation effect for the EC/EFTA (European Free Trade
Association), "a persistent bias has emerged which underestimated TD [trade diversion]." Id. at
12-13, para. 23.
20. Id. at 12, para. 23. See also Balassa, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European
Common Market, 77 EcON. J. 1 (1967), in which the conclusion about predicting the impact of
RTAs is reinforced: "[W]hile a number of criteria have been put forward for appraising the
chances of trade creation and trade diversion in a union, it seems to be generally agreed that an a
priori judgment regarding the net effect of a customs union on trade flows cannot be made." Id.
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C.

Arguments Against RTAs

There are a wide range of additional perspectives as to the merits
of RTAs beyond those founded on political/military stabilization or
pure analytic economics. The concerns of those who believe that
global economic welfare is best served by an open trading system as
embodied in the GATT, and who are concerned that a preoccupation
with regional arrangements will undermine the open system, are articulated by Professor Riesenfeld:
Let me remind you that the basic blueprint of a new world order
designed at Bretton Woods was that of a peaceful, nondiscriminating,
and open system of economic and trade relations of global dimensions
and that both bilateralism and regionalism were viewed, at best, as an
exception and transitional phase in the realization of the ultimate goal.
Thus the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which survived as the remnant of the idea of the International Trade Organization
planned in Havana, was instituted as the instrument governing worldwide liberalized, if not free, trade.
It was clear from the beginning of that system that the building of a
free global trade system would not be easy and would take a sequence of
negotiating rounds. For that reason and to accommodate perceived benefits of customs unions and free trade areas, Article XXIV of GATT
excepted arrangements of that type from the sweep of the most favored
nation treatment requirement which is the central provision of the system....
Regional cooperation in trade and resource conservation and sharing
is both necessary and desirable. Nevertheless, regionalism should not be
at the expense of a global perspective of the ultimate needs of mankind. 21
Those who believe that world economic welfare is maximized by
the broadest opening of national markets, giving the widest room for
the functioning of the laws of comparative advantage, naturally view
RTAs with suspicion. RTAs by their very nature distort international
markets because they create preferences for intra-regional trade. It is
only second-best to argue that comparative advantage is at least extended beyond narrow national borders into a region when the best
alternative of extending comparative advantage on a global basis is
available.
Second, countries which form RTAs are often geographically contiguous and at relatively comparable stages of economic development.
If regional preferences are granted among, a group of countries at an
advanced stage of economic development, this may only widen the
schism between more and less developed countries by permitting those
with existing advantages to enhance their status without extending the
21. Riesenfeld, Pacific Ocean Resources: The New Regionalism and the Global System, 16
L.Q. 355-56, 359 (1989).

ECOLOGY
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benefits of expanded trade opportunities to the less developed. In this
22
sense RTAs may function to widen the gap between rich and poor.
Third, smaller countries which are not part of a natural alignment
in a geographic region or which are part of a region in which their
particular attributes are not rewarded are threatened by RTAs. This
threat may be of a political nature, as when a particular country finds
that it lacks the leverage necessary to secure equitable treatment from
the regional partners with which it finds itself aligned. Some countries
may, by virtue of geography or political incompatibility, be excluded
from whatever benefits RTAs have to offer.
Fourth, transnational business enterprises are concerned that regional trade preferences will inhibit their access to markets. Protectionist policies intended to foster the development of regionally-based
industries are a threat to the global enterprise, which thrives in the
open market. Much of the adverse effect which protectionist policies
may have on transnational enterprises may be ameliorated by extending to them the right to establish themselves and take on a local
23
character within the RTA.
Individuals, either as consumers or employees, certainly have interests in the question whether RTAs create global welfare benefits. If
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the EC experience are
illustrative, the most significant individual concerns with respect to the
establishment of RTAs are expressed by employees whose job security
is threatened by the liberalization of markets and regional operation of
comparative advantage. More abstract concerns about whether RTA
comparative advantage or global comparative advantage is the better
alternative for economic prosperity are left for senior government offi24
cials to ponder.
Finally, it is easy to be concerned that a marked trend toward the
solution of economic problems on a regional level will undercut efforts
to resolve economic problems on a global level. A form of regional
22. The concerns of developing countries with respect both to the schism which may be
exacerbated between rich and poor and to the potential for isolation from compatible RTAs were
articulated on March 27, 1990, by the Hon. Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore at the
"Around the Uruguay Round Conference" sponsored by the American Society of International
Law, in cooperation with Oceana Group (Wash., D.C., Mar. 27-28, 1990). Oceana Group will
publish these proceedings.
23. For a discussion of right of establishment, see infra text accompanying notes 64-67, 149.
24. See, e.g., Canada Girds for Action on Trade Bill, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1988, at A3, col.
1; Canada Begins Final Battle Over Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, at AI0, col. 1.
Concern over the employment effects of the U.S.-Canada FTA has by no means diminished more
than a year after its implementation. See, e.g., Conflicting Reports of Success, Failure, Follow First
Year of Bilateral Free Trade, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 53 (Jan. 10, 1990); Economic Insecurity
Resulting from FTA Is Damaging to Canada, Report Concludes, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 737
(May 23, 1990).
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isolationism could emerge and diminish the authority of global institutions such as the GATT. Even if regional groups at the outset express
a commitment to long-term participation in an open global trading
system, enthusiasm for that system might well be undermined by a
preoccupation with more immediate regional concerns. 25
D. Arguments For RTAs
There are forceful arguments in favor of RTAs. First, if it were
true that the global economic system functioned as the harmonious
interplay of 160 sovereign States negotiating the progressive liberalization of trade barriers to the ultimate benefit of all mankind, it might be
difficult to promote the RTA concept. However, the world trade community is not functioning in this utopian sense, 26 leaving RTA proponents to argue that the best road to the eventual utopia is through the
formation of RTAs, whose members gain experience in economic cooperation through the formation of regional institutions, the intra-regional reduction of trade barriers, and the creation and operation of
effective dispute resolution bodies. By demonstrating the advantages
of market liberalization on a smaller scale, the RTAs promote liberalization on a larger, universal scale. 2 7 If the current system can be portrayed as one in which cooperation is difficult because of widely
divergent national interests which are difficult to resolve on a countryto-country basis, the better idea may be to encourage the formation of
a dozen regional groups which will thereafter negotiate on the basis of
regional interests in a less fragmented environment. The EC can be
pointed to as an example of regional cooperation in the formation of
institutions, removal of barriers, creation of dispute mechanisms and
25. See generally Riesenfeld, supra note 21. Cottier points out that the advantages which the
EC may gain in the short run from adopting discriminatory regulations may well plague the EC
in the long run as it becomes subject to equivalent treatment by other RTAs, to which the EC
will be hard-pressed to deny the same discriminatory privileges. Cottier, supra note 1, at 164. As
Hudec has pointed out, in the absence of a political compromise, the formation of the EC could
well have led the world community into making a choice between the GATT and the EC, as it
was apparent that the proposed EC structure (in the agricultural area, for example) was inconsistent with GATT rules. R. HUDEC, supra note I, at 211-12; see also 0. LONG, supra note 4, at 6971. Whether future choices between regional and global interests can be resolved without threatening to undermine the global system remains, of course, to be seen.
26. Dam noted that each of the four possible TC/TD effects of an RTA he described were
"inferior to one in which all foreign sources are free from divergences between prices paid by
consumers and prices received by producers - the utopian conditions of world free trade."
Dam, supra note 1, at 627.
27. This perspective is largely derived from a June 1990 conversation with Professor Meinhard Hilf of the University of Bielefeld. An excellent analysis of the external effect of Community activities with respect to completion of the internal market, including discussion of a number
of the points made in this paragraph, appears in Hilf, The Single European Act and 1992: Legal
Implicationsfor Third Countries, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 94 (1990).
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promotion of a common trade policy which makes the Community
easier to deal with than twelve independently negotiating European
nations. Whether the EC experience can be replicated in other regions
is an interesting and difficult question. Other RTAs have not been
nearly so successful. 28 A particularly significant feature of the EC that
may provide a model for other regional arrangements, and, ultimately,
the global trading system, is the direct applicability of Community law
to the individual and the extension to the individual of direct access to
the judiciary for the purpose of challenging Community regulation.
Second, RTAs can be viewed as the engines which will drive global
economic development. 29 If it is true that a regional group of economically advanced countries will accelerate intra-group development beyond that achievable by a more economically disparate and
geographically diverse universe of countries, it may be preferable to
encourage this advancement which can then be used to improve the lot
of the less economically fortunate. Just how this economic bootstrapping will occur remains to be seen, but mechanisms surely are
conceivable.
Finally, RTAs are a reality. Although the EC is evolving at a
rapid pace and both its immediate and longer-term structural futures
are unclear, it would be somewhat disingenuous to propose the dismantling of the EC because RTAs are not a demonstrated virtue.
Even a cautionary message to the Heads of State of the Western Hemisphere who seem to have collectively concluded that bilateral and regional free trade areas will further their collective interests would be
unlikely to turn the tide of history. The more limited ambition of this
article is to attempt to define a rule or rules which will help to constrain the post-Uruguay Round policies of RTAs within limits which
are reasonably consistent with the concept of a liberal global trading
system, and thus are less likely to lead to a disintegration of that
system.

28. The observation that the EC may be alone in its success not only at building an internal
integration structure but in articulating a common external trade policy is derived from a conversation with Professor Stefan Riesenfeld of the University of California at Berkeley in June 1990.
See also Note of GATT Secretariat, supra note 17, at 4, para. 6, which observes: "Since the early
1970s, growth in the number and incidence of regional trade and economic co-operation arrangements has been little short of phenomenal, even if success rates remain far less impressive."
29. Viner noted that even if the short-term effects of RTA formation were trade creating,
such trade creation would "in the short-run at least" represent a loss to the outside world which
could have participated directly in the liberalization of the RTA market. Viner said that the
outside world ". . . can gain in the long-run only as the result of the general diffusion of the
increased prosperity of the customs union area." J. VINER, supra note 14, at 44.
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30
The General Agreement is tolerant of the formation of RTAs.
Provided that the members of a prospective RTA notify the GATT
Contracting Parties and meet a requirement that their formation
measures will involve "substantially all the trade" among them, 3' they
are permitted under article XXIV of the General Agreement to ignore
the GATT's Most Favored Nation treatment principle and grant each
other tariff preferences which need not be extended to non-RTA members (as well as, in the case of a "customs union," to form a common
tariff wall). 32 The incidence of tariffs affecting non-members of a customs union is not to exceed "on the whole" the tariffs which were
applicable to them prior to the formation of the RTA. Tariffs affecting
non-members of a free trade area ("FTA") should be no higher than
those applied to them by each member of the FTA prior to its formation. The GATT Contracting Parties have never refused an article
33
XXIV waiver to a prospective RTA.

30. On the specific subject of the GATT RTA exemption, in addition to the references cited
in note 1,supra, see Loveday, Article XXIVof the GA TTRules, 11 ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE
1(1958); Haight, supra note 12; P. LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1975).
31. With regard to both customs unions and free trade areas, article XXIV requires that
tariffs be eliminated with respect to "substantially all trade" among the constituent territories, in
theory precluding reliance on the RTA waiver by a substantially less than all-inclusive arrangement. The "substantially all trade" requirement is intended to preclude GATT parties from
entering into relatively non-inclusive reciprocal trade arrangements as an excuse for derogating
from their Most Favored Nation obligations. The "substantially all trade" requirement has not
played a significant role in GATT deliberations with respect to RTAs because a Contracting
Party objecting to the fact that a proposed RTA does not involve "substantially all trade" is in
effect asking that additional discriminatory tariff preferences be implemented by the RTA in
order to meet the test.
32. A "customs union," such as the European Community, involves not only the elimination
of intra-RTA tariffs (and other regulations of commerce), but also the formation of a common
external tariff wall. A "free trade area" ("FTA") involves only the elimination of intra-FTA
tariffs (and other regulations of commerce). "RTA" is used in this article to apply both to customs unions and FTAs unless the context indicates otherwise. This article focuses primarily on
customs unions and, in particular, the EC. The distinction between customs unions and FTAs
does not appear to alter either the problems posed or the solutions analyzed or recommended in
this article. The ultimate aims of the parties to an RTA in terms of the level of integration they
seek to achieve may be material to a determination whether specific discriminatory agreements
they enter into are "necessary" in the context of the formula proposed infra.
33. See J. JACKSON, supra note 1,at 141. The article XXIV "waiver" process involves in
essence a "negative" clearance as opposed to an affirmative act of approval. Pursuant to article
XXIV(7), parties to the GATT which intend to join a prospective RTA must notify the Contracting Parties. The latter will study the plan and, if they find it objectionable, make recommendations to the prospective RTA members, which are obliged to modify their proposal in order to
secure the waiver.
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Most Favored Nation and National Treatment Derogations
1. The MFN Principle
Article XXIV permits discriminatory preferences with respect to
"duties and other regulations of commerce" maintained in each of the
constituent territories of an RTA. Though article XXIV is decidedly
vague, this reference appears to be directed at permitting only derogations from the GATT MFN principle, specifically as it requires each
GATT Contracting Party that grants a tariff benefit to any country to
extend immediately and unconditionally the same benefit to all GATT
Contracting Parties. 34 Under this narrow construction, preferential
arrangements under article XXIV are limited to the discriminatory
reduction or elimination of intra-RTA tariffs and should not extend to
the discriminatory reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers such
as internal sales taxes (e.g., the removal or reduction of taxes only in
favor of regionally-produced goods). The latter type of preferential
treatment would involve derogation both from the GATT MFN principle (regarding equivalency of treatment for all GATT Contracting
Parties) and from the GATT National Treatment principle.
2.

The National Treatment Principle

The National Treatment principle is a fundamental tenet of the
GATT. Each Contracting Party agrees to treat goods from each other
Contracting Party on a level comparable to those produced in its own
territory for the purposes of internal sale. 35 Article XXIV does not
expressly address deviations from the National Treatment principle
and there is no good reason to conclude that the drafters of the General Agreement intended that RTAs be permitted to grant internal
preferences to locally produced goods. However, on a purely semantic
level, a case for an interpretation of article XXIV which permits dero34. Dam and Jackson both refer to article XXIV as providing an exception to the MFN
principle in the context of its application to tariffs. Dam, supra note 1, at 616; J. JACKSON, supra
note 1, at 141. Hudec's discussion of article XXIV is couched in terms of "discrimination," but
also focuses on the historic use of article XXIV to justify preferential tariff arrangements (including the EC's controversial variable levies). R. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 211-26.
It is well worth noting that in 1963, when then-Professor Dam wrote his classic analysis of
article XXIV, tariff barriers and quotas were considered the most problematic barriers to international trade. Dam wrote:
While many internal policies and practices both in importing and exporting countries may
create other kinds of divergences between prices paid by consumers and costs incurred by
producers-monopolies, cartels and local direct and indirect taxes, for example-the primary international barriers to optimization of allocation of world resources are tariffs and
quantitative restrictions.
Dam, supra note 1, at 624. It is certainly not clear that twenty-seven years later Mr. Dam would
reach the same conclusion.
35. General Agreement, supra note 4, at art. III.
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gation from the National Treatment principle can be made, though
such interpretation is by no means widely accepted.3 6 This is not to
say that there is absolutely no scholarly support for the proposition
that article XXIV permits derogations from provisions of the GATT
other than the MFN principle as it applies to tariffs and related
charges and regulations, 37 or that the EC (for example) has not from
time to time adopted and been challenged for adopting regional internal discriminations with respect to locally-produced goods.3 8
36. Since the article XXIV waiver refers explicitly to "other regulations of commerce," it
might be construed to refer to the National Treatment principle involving, for example, tax regulations. In his 1969 treatise, Jackson reported one instance in which the EC argued that article
XXIV(5)(a) of the General Agreement permitted it to impose common quotas for balance of
payments purposes when the individual Member States of the EC could not each justify a quota
because of the reference to "other regulations." Most members of the GATT group studying the
question objected to this interpretation, arguing, according to Jackson, "that this term ['regulations'] ...was meant to apply to such things as customs procedures, grading and marketing
requirements, and similar routine controls." LAW OF GATT,supra note 1, at 617. Jackson goes
on to suggest that since article XXIV(1) and (8)(a) provide that a customs union will be treated
as a Contracting Party by the GATT, "it can be argued that once a customs union is instituted
the provisions of GATT apply to that customs union as a whole." Id. at 617. While this might
permit the establishment of a common quota, it would seem to follow from this reasoning that
the National Treatment principle would apply to an RTA such as the EC as a whole, so that an
RTA would be obligated to extend the benefits of its regulatory policies "as a whole" to nonmember Contracting Parties.
Another semantic approach to the suggestion that the article XXIV waiver applies to National Treatment would note that article I(1) of the General Agreement, in addressing the matters as to which MFN treatment must be extended (e.g., "customs duties and charges"), requires
that "all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III" be extended on an unconditional MFN basis. Article III establishes the National Treatment principle and paragraphs 2 and
4 refer to internal taxes and all other regulations affecting internal sale, respectively. It might
therefore be argued that an RTA exemption from the MFN principle includes at least a limited
exemption from the National Treatment principle, since the MFN provision of the General
Agreement operates to extend National Treatment on an MFN basis. However, this argument is
not persuasive since, among other reasons, article XXIV does not expressly refer to exemption
from article I(1), but instead to the preferential elimination of duties and other regulations of
commerce.
37. The only learned support for a more expansive view of the article XXIV waiver which
this author has discovered is a somewhat arcane passage in an article by Petersmann in which he
states:
Some of these 'prohibitive' rules [of the GATT] (including rules prescribing non-discrimination and national treatment) are subject to exceptions which reserve a margin of discretion
(e.g., Art. XII: balance of payments restrictions; Art. XXI: security exceptions; Art. XXIV:
free-trade areas and customs unions); hence, the invocation of such an exception clause may
have the effect of suspending the direct applicability of the prohibitive rule or of reducing its
directly applicable content to a certain normative core.
Petersmann, The EEC as a GA TT Member - Legal Conflicts between GA TT Law and European
Community Law, in EC AND GATT, supra note 1,at 49.
38. Petersmann, id. at 49-50, discusses a number of GATT dispute settlement proceedings
involving claims that the EC violated "prohibitive" GATT rules, including the National Treatment principle. In a case involving a complaint by the United States regarding an alleged violation of article III (National Treatment), the European Court of Justice declared the complainedof discriminatory internal regulations null and void prior to a GATT Council ruling that the EC
had violated article III. When Portugal acceded to the EC in 1986, the United States imposed
increased duties on EC products alleging, inter alia, that the regulations reserving parts of Portugal's agricultural imports to Member States violated the EC's GATT obligations. See Bello and
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3. Application of Article XXIV to Services
Assuming that article XXIV is intended only to permit exceptions
to an RTA's MFN obligation with respect to tariffs, in its current formulation it is not usefully applied to trade in services. In the context
of regulating trade in goods, an RTA typically subjects non-member
goods to a tariff as they cross its external border. An RTA extends a
preference to regionally-produced goods by not imposing a tariff on
them. Foreign or external goods are acted upon on the basis of their
origin - i.e., coming from outside the RTA's external border. Similarly, "preferred" goods - those which were either produced within
the RTA or have already paid the entry fee or tariff - are not acted
upon because they are within the tariff wall. In sum, article XXIV
permits RTAs to favor local production by removing intra-RTA tariff
barriers without eliminating external barriers (and, in39 the case of a
customs union, by erecting a common external wall).
The regulation of trade in services is a more complex matter. Because services are routinely provided by persons "at the site," they are
generally not subject to "border measures" such as tariffs (although
there are border measures affecting services, such as employee visa requirements). External service providers are typically regulated (and
discriminated against) both on a national and RTA level by internal
regulations such as licensing requirements which establish, either expressly or through their operational effect, different standards of treatment for local (or "national") and foreign (or non-RTA member
country) service providers. The trade regulation of "foreign" service
providers, then, occurs not necessarily (or even generally) at an RTA's
external border, but rather internally where rules and regulations may
be either expressly or operationally discriminatory. A local service
provider licensing requirement, in order to discriminate against a foreign service provider, need not expressly preclude the foreign service
provider from operating locally if such a licensing requirement provides, for example, that the provider must possess certain local acaHolmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW. 211,
216-18 (1987). The parties eventually reached a settlement in this matter.
39. This is not to suggest that tariffs are the only border measures which affect trade in
goods. Goods crossing borders are also subject, for example, to inspections intended to assure
compliance with health and safety regulations. These border measures may have effects on foreign exporters disproportionate to the impact which internal RTA regulations relating to health
and safety have on their intra-RTA counterparts. The GATT, however, disapproves of such
measures when used as disguised restrictions on trade. Moreover, it is important to note that the
GATT General Agreement approves the use of tariffs negotiated within the GATT framework,
and favors tariffs over other trade restrictive measures such as quotas, in the belief that tariffs are
the least trade distorting form of trade regulation. See 0. LONG, supra note 4, at 10; LAW OF
GATT, supra note 1, at 305-16.
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demic credentials which cannot reasonably be obtained by a person
seeking to enter the market (and which are not a reasonable requirement for the license). Insurance and banking enterprises might be discriminatorily impaired from providing services across borders as a
result of disparate capital or reserve requirements which are arbitrary
or unjustified. Thus, trade restrictions based on nationality may be
"disguised" in the form of licensing or other regulatory requirements
which do not expressly contain reference to nationality. To the extent
that such regulatory requirements are arbitrary or unjustified, they are
the equivalent, from a trade regulation standpoint, of denial of National Treatment.
A recent Gatt Panel Report, which involves a claim by the EC
against the United States arising out of the discriminatory impact of
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, makes clear that compliance
with the National Treatment principle is not to be confined by reference to the language of rules or regulations. An inquiry into the application (or potential application) of the rules or regulations is
appropriate. 4° An analysis of legal rules should not be confined to
instances of their application, but should take into account their "po41
tential impact" as well.
If foreign services (and service providers) were regulated/dutied by
individual countries or RTAs only when they literally crossed borders,
much foreign or external trade would go unregulated because it would
in fact be provided locally. 42 In the services context, differential treatment must to some extent be based (expressly or by operational effect)
on the nationality of the service provider, and any such differential will
involve the National Treatment principle.
4.

The Need to Modify Article XXIV

If RTAs are to be permitted to discriminate in favor of services of
40. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel, GATT Doc.
L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), at 52, para 5.11 [hereinafter Panel Report].
41. Id. at 53, para. 5.13.
42. To illustrate, an accounting firm in the United States can provide its services to a manufacturing entity in France in essentially one of two ways. It may either respond to trans-Atlantic
telephone calls, or it may open an office in France. If it relies on trans-Atlantic telecommunications, its services will be much like goods passing an external RTA barrier where they can be
regulated by tariff. If, on the other hand, it establishes an office in France, the French and the
EC have two choices. They can either treat the French office just like any French national's
office and therefore not discriminate, or they can impose regulations on the office based on its
American (or foreign) character. If they choose to treat the office like any French national's
office, they have applied the National Treatment principle. If they choose to have special licensing requirements for the office, they have derogated from the National Treatment principle
(although some derogation from pure National Treatment based on public policy considerations
is to be expected).
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local/regional origin, such permission must therefore be couched at
least partially in terms of derogation from the National Treatment
principle. An amended form of article XXIV will therefore be needed
in a GATT agreement on services to incorporate the concept of derogation from the National Treatment principle (in addition to derogation from the MFN principle) if certain RTA discriminations in the
services sector are to be permitted. 43 This article is concerned with the
conceptual underpinnings to and the potential form of such an
amended provision." Moreover, it is a premise of this article that the
adoption in a GATT services agreement (or other "new area" agreement) of a new formula for evaluating RTA discriminations will not
put an end to debate over the appropriate limits of that formula. Because of the innumerable potential mechanisms of non-tariff barrier
trade discrimination and the wide array of services, investment mechanisms, etc., it is difficult to imagine that any formula will permit a neat
evaluation of all potentially discriminatory measures which RTAs
might adopt.

45

1 43. The General Agreement contains a few "safeguard" provisions which permit
contracting
parties to adopt and enforce measures which derogate from more general GATT obligations
when vital national interests are at stake. Safeguard measures include those which permit the
adoption of measures to protect public morals and health, and measures to secure compliance

with laws not inconsistent with the General Agreement (art. XX); to protect essential (and narrowly defined) security interests (art. XXI); to safeguard the balance of payments (art. XII); and
to deal on an emergency basis with imports of particular products (art. XIX). Thus, the General
Agreement contemplates derogation from pure National Treatment (as well as Most Favored
Nation treatment) in certain circumstances. An RTA might therefore be justified, i.e., at least if
all its component member state contracting parties were justified) in adopting and enforcing
certain narrowly circumscribed measures derogating from the National Treatment principle even
without an amendment to article XXIV, pursuant to the generally applicable safeguard measures
incorporated in the General Agreement.
44. Of course, an MFN provision in a GATT services agreement must also address the nationality of "service providers" as well as the "country of origin" of "services." In this context, a
service provider might be analogized to a mobile producer of goods who carries his/her country
of origin with him/her. A services MFN provision would provide that liberalizing regulations
applicable to the service providers of any party to the agreement would be extended immediately
and unconditionally to the service providers of any other party to the agreement.
45. Just as National Treatment is not an absolute concept in the General Agreement with
respect to goods, it certainly will not be an absolute concept with respect to services. It seems
fair to assume that countries will be permitted to discriminate in favor of local service providers
with respect to the provision of certain national security-related services. Services Framework
Agreement, para. 7(b), reprinted in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: DecisionsAdopted
at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round (April 8, 1989), 28 I.L.M. 1023, 1036 (1989)
[hereinafter GATS Framework]. In addition, certain sectors will undoubtedly be liberalized progressively so that for some period of time there will be allowances for various domestic producer
preferences. Id. at 1037, para. 7(b). Finally, it is virtually certain that concessions will be made
in favor of developing countries which will at least temporarily permit differential treatment of
domestic and foreign service providers. Id. at 1037, paras. 7(b), (f). Thus, within the context of
a Uruguay Round agreement on the liberalization of trade in services there will undoubtedly be
categories of permissible deviation from a new National Treatment standard.
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Both the United States 46 and the EC47 have prepared and submitted to the GATT Negotiating Group on Trade in Services a specific
proposal for an agreement on trade in services. These proposals followed the adoption by the Contracting Parties of a services Framework Agreement at the Uruguay Round Mid-Term Review. 48 The
U.S. and EC proposals demonstrate much more clearly than the very
general Framework Agreement the type of commitments more likely
to emerge from the services negotiations. Both the United States and
the EC submitted their proposals in the form of a separate GATT
agreement or Code rather than an amendment to the General Agreement, reflecting an assumption that, with respect to services, the twothirds majority of the Contracting Parties necessary for an amendment
to the General Agreement itself will not be forthcoming at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 49 Both Code proposals envisage that separate "Annexes" will be adopted to add specificity to, clarify or
modify the Code with respect to the regulation of trade in specific sec50
tors such as financial services and telecommunications.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, the U.S.
and EC proposals are of comparative interest from the standpoint both
of their points of convergence and their points of divergence. Both
would incorporate the fundamental principle of National Treatment as
a litmus test of liberalization. 5 ' Thus, each party to a Services Code
would agree, under both proposals, to grant to service providers of
other Code parties treatment equivalent to that of their own nationals.
Application of the National Treatment principle assumes, of course,
that service providers are effectively enabled to enter the local market
(i.e. are granted market access) in the first place. 52 Both proposals
46. Communication from the United States: Agreement on Trade in Services, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/75 (Oct. 17, 1989) [hereinafter U.S. Services Proposal].
47. EC Services Proposal, supra note 8.
48. GATS Framework, supra note 45, at 1036.
49. This author has recently discussed at some length the distinction between an amendment
to the General Agreement and a GATT Code. Abbott, supra note 5, at 721-32. In that article it
was observed that a code arrangement was a much more acceptable outcome for the services
sector negotiations than for the GATT intellectual property rights negotiations, primarily because the utility of services liberalization in the OECD countries (i.e., absent the participation of
the developing countries) would be relatively high and therefore justify the effort necessary to
conclude such an arrangement. Id. at 724.
50. US. Services Proposal, supra note 46, at art. 3.1; EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at
art. XVIII. Draft Telecommunications Annexes of the United States and EC are discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 142 and 143.
51. US. Services Proposal, supra note 46, at art. 8; EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at art.
IV.
52. The US. Services Proposal's National Treatment provision explicitly provides that it will
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envisage that Code party governments will, in spite of the National
Treatment provisions, retain the right to apply different regulations to
foreign service providers than to domestic providers when such regulations are required for public policy reasons, 53 but each would in its
own way preclude the application of differential regulations intended
as artificial barriers to liberalization. 54 Both proposals would permit
derogation from the National Treatment principle in the area of government procurement (not intended for resale), 55 a matter which presumably will be further dealt with in revisions to the Government
Procurement Code.
Both proposals would incorporate a Most Favored Nation provision, so that benefits granted to any party to the Services Code will be
made available to all other parties to the Code. 5 6 The U.S. and EC
proposals each take a different approach to the question of derogations
from the MFN obligation with respect to liberalization commitments
beyond those initially agreed to, though these differences appear to be
more a matter of form than substance. Under each proposal, it appears to be envisaged that each Code party's initial schedule of liberalization commitments will apply to all other parties to the Code. 57 The
U.S. proposal seems to suggest that additional benefits provided by
each party under the Code will be the subject of separate Protocols
(for added liberalization to covered sectors) or Special Agreements
(for non-Code-covered sectors).5 8 The EC proposal appears to contemplate progressive rounds of multilateral liberalization negotiations
and agreements5 9 pursuant to which any party entering into a liberalization commitment beyond that to which it was previously subject
may choose not to extend that commitment to another party "when it
take effect "[w]henever market access has been achieved by a service provider of another Party."
U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 8.1.
53. Id. at arts. 8.2., 16.2; EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at arts. V(1)(a), XV.
54. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 11.1; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at
art. V(l)(b), (3).
55. U.S. Services Proposal, supra note 46, at art. 8.3; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at
art. XIV.
56. Id. at art. 9; EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at art. II.
57. The initial Schedules provided for in each proposal apparently do not contemplate that
any Code party will be entitled to treat other Code parties on different bases. See US.Services
Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 2.2; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. XIX. The U.S.

Services Proposal specifically states that reservations to certain provisions (including National
Treatment, but not the Schedules) must be on a nondiscriminatory basis. US.Services Proposal,
supra note 46, at art. 22.1. Both proposals, however, would permit parties to refrain from applying the Code as a whole to other parties. Id. at art. 28; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.

XXII(l).
58. US. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 3.2, 3.3.
59. See EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. XX.
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considers that the level of commitment of the other party is not in
keeping with the particular characteristics of that party's market and
its degree of liberalization. '"60
The United States and the EC follow somewhat different approaches to establishing the universe of services to be liberalized under
the Code, although both are variations of a so-called "negative" listing
approach. Under the U.S. proposal there will be a collectively agreedto list of service sectors covered by the Code, to which each party may
independently adopt its own exclusions. 6 1 Under the EC proposal the
assumption is made that all traded services will be covered by the
Code, 62 except those that each party independently elects to reserve
through enumeration on a separate schedule. 63 Under a "positive"
listing approach (used by neither the United States or EC), parties
would be expected to liberalize only those sectors which they individually designated. A positive approach would presumably result in a
lesser degree of overall liberalization.
One of the major differences between the U.S. and EC proposals
concerns recognition of the "right of establishment." The U.S. proposal would specifically require each Code party to agree that persons of
other parties could establish or expand a commercial presence on the
territory of that party on a basis no less favorable than that of the
party's national persons. 64 The EC proposal makes a reference to
measures affecting "commercial or professional presence" as being
subject to the Code, 65 but does not otherwise specifically address the
right of establishment. This difference could be read merely as one of
shading or nuance, since the general National Treatment provision in
each Code proposal could be construed so as to require the equivalent
treatment of applications for establishment. If such is the intended
construction, the EC might be faulted for subtlety or the United States
criticized for overconscientious specificity. Further supporting the
"mere nuance" hypothesis is the fact that the U.S. National Treatment
provision is directed at service providers "whenever market access has
been achieved,"' 66 while the EC National Treatment provision more
broadly refers to "service providers of other parties. ' 67 However,
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at art. XXI.
U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 2.2.
EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. 1(2).
Id. at art. XIX.
U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 4.
EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at art. I(l)(c).
U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 8.1. See also supra note 52.
EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. IV(1). This suggests that the EC assumes that
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since National Treatment can only truly become meaningful to a service provider which is able to enter a market, and since the right of
establishment in an RTA like the Community is of paramount importance to foreign providers, the absence of specific mention of this right
in the EC proposal may understandably give rise to questions of inten-

tion from participants in the negotiating process.

Both Code proposals envision transparency of regulations, 68
equivalent treatment by government monopolies, 69 balance of payments measures, 70 freedom of currency movement 7 I and (at least temporary) mobility of key labor 7 2 as elements of an eventual Services
Code. Both proposals make specific provision against harmful subsidies, 73 and the EC proposal also envisages antidumping procedures
and makes allowance for restrictive business practices regulation. 74 In
addition, both proposals would permit the imposition of measures relating to such matters as public morals and health, protection of privacy and the prevention of deceptive practices. 75
Although it is not apparent whether the proposed provisions are
intended to supplant or merely supplement those provided in the

Technical Standards Code (and this requires clarification from the
Community), 76 the EC proposal addresses (certainly in more detail
than the U.S. proposal) the topic of "rules, standards and qualifications."' 77 The EC proposal permits the adoption of standards based on
enterprises will be able to establish themselves, while the United States wishes to point out that a
two-step approach is involved: first, establishment and second, National Treatment.
68. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 12; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.
VI.
69. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 10; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.
Ix.
70. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 15; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.
XII.
71. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 14.2; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at
art. XIII(I).
72. U.S. Services Proposal, supra note 46, at art. 6; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.
I(l)(d).
73. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 13; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art.
VII.
74. EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at arts. VIII, X.
75. U.S. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 16.2; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at
art. XV.
76. Although not apparent from the language referred to in note 77, infra, it may be that the
EC's intent here is to address only those types of standards which are applicable to the provision
of professional services (which the U.S. proposal refers to as licensing requirements). This conclusion might be inferred from the fact that the GATT Technical Standards Code, discussed
infra, concerns itself in some detail with technical standards which, within the GATT framework
and according to its terms, has typically affected the production and sale of goods. If the intent is
to apply the Technical Standards Code to the services area and to supplement the provisions of
that Code, this will also need to be made clear.
77. US. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 7 (regarding only licensing and certification);
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public policy considerations as well as objective requirements, using
international standards where appropriate. According to the proposal, the standards adopted should not render inoperative a commitment to grant market access. Standards requirements may be waived

where the rules of the provider's home territory guarantee equivalent
regulatory conditions. The proposal also emphasizes that measures
should be formulated in a transparent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, and neither the formulation nor administration of such
measures should constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade in services. Interestingly, the EC
Code proposal takes note of an interrelationship between its general
provision on standards and the EC's draft RTA waiver. 7 8 The Community appears to envisage that it will have the right, pursuant to its
RTA waiver, to conclude intra-Community standards agreements
under the conditions of the RTA waiver, and not the generally applicable provisions of the Services Code.

IV. THE EC's PROPOSAL FOR

AN

RTA WAIVER

Article III(1) of the EC Services Code proposal states:
Subject to the conditions [sic] that the resulting regime is on the whole
no more restrictive than that resulting from previous commitments set
out in its schedule, this Agreement shall not prevent any party from being a party to an agreement aiming at a higher degree of liberalization of
trade in services in the framework of a customs union or free-trade area
EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. V. Because of the importance of standards rules (and
lack of discrimination) to effective liberalization of the telecommunications market, portions of
the EC proposal with regard to standards may usefully be quoted here:
1(a) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, parties shall have the right to regulate
the provision of services in accordance with public policy considerations. Rules, standards
and qualifications required for the provision of a service within a party's territory shall be
based on objective requirements, such as competence or the ability to provide a service.
Whenever appropriate, recourse should be made to internationally agreed requirements.
b) Rules, standards and qualifications required shall not be more burdensome than necessary for the attainment of the public policy consideration envisaged, and shall not in any
case render inoperative, in any part of the territory and for the entire range of activities
concerned, a commitment to grant market access.
3.(a) Measures under paragraphs I and 2 of this Article shall be formulated in a transparent, reasonable and non-arbitrary manner. Each party shall ensure their transparent,
uniform, impartial and reasonable administration.
(b) Neither formulation nor administration of such measures may in effect constitute an
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between parties or a disguised restriction on international trade in services.
Id.
78. The relevant provision reads:
In cases other than those provided in Article III (the RTA waiver provision] parties may
negotiate and conclude among themselves or with other countries agreements providing for
the harmonisation or mutual recognition of rules, standards and qualifications. Other parties
shall be given the opportunity to negotiate accession to such agreements.
EC Services Proposal, supra note 8, at art. V(2)(b) (emphasis added).
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within the meaning of Article XXIV paragraph 8 of the GATT, or to
adopt an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union
or free-trade area whose scope would include trade in services.
The EC's RTA waiver proposal permits individual member countries of an RTA to enter into agreements among themselves "aiming at
a higher degree of liberalization."' 79 In the context of the Services
Code, this involves a right of derogation from both the Most Favored
Nation and National Treatment principles. First, comparable to article XXIV of the General Agreement regarding tariff barriers applicable to trade in goods, the member countries of an RTA will be entitled
to grant more liberal service trade terms to each other without immediately and unconditionally extending these benefits to each non-RTA
party to the Services Code - that is, the MFN principle will be
waived. Second, because the "liberalization" commitments of parties
to the Services Code will distinctly involve the grant of National
Treatment rights to other Code parties, the waiver permitting RTA
members to adopt more liberalizing agreements among themselves
(without extending these agreements to other Code parties on an
MFN basis) means that they will also not be granting equivalent i.e., National - treatment to non-members.8 0 It is the right to derogate from the National Treatment principle which is of great concern
because it involves a significant departure from prior GATT law. As
discussed previously, the article XXIV waiver concerns only the right
to grant intra-RTA tariff preferences on a non-MFN basis. While a
waiver of the obligation to apply the National Treatment principle is
not expressly stated in the EC proposal, it is necessarily implicit in it.
If it were to be assumed, conversely, that National Treatment would
remain a constant governing principle regardless of the waiver propo79. Interpretation of the EC's RTA waiver proposal is made somewhat problematic by its

reference to the rights of a "party," giving rise to potentially differing interpretations depending
upon whether "party" refers to each member state in an RTA or to the RTA itself. In the
context of the draft provision, "party" would appear to refer to individual member state components of an RTA. However, the EC Services Code proposal makes provisions for acceptance by

the EC itself (EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at art. XXIX(l)), leaving some room for doubt
as to whether the EC intends that it be adopted by its individual member countries, by the EC as
a regional organization or by both as a "mixed" agreement. This must be clarified by the EC not
only as it impacts its draft RTA waiver, but also as it will impact the negotiation and preparation

of the various schedules provided for in its proposal. See Hilf, The Application of GA TT within
Member States of the Community, with Special Reference to the FRG, in EC AND GATT,supra

note 1,at 153-73, for a discussion of the reasons why the EC and its Member States have concluded GATT undertakings in various configurations. Hilf observes that "the Member States are
increasingly urging a 'mixed conclusion' of agreements to preserve their influence on the foreign
trade policy of the Community." Id. at 165.
80. RTA members will presumably retain an MFN obligation outside the membership of the
RTA. That is, to the extent that a specific level of treatment is extended to one non-RTA member Code party, that level of treatment must immediately and unconditionally be extended to all
non-RTA member Code parties.
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sal, there would be no apparent point to the waiver, since the benefits
of internal liberalizing measures ("higher" or otherwise) would automatically be passed on to non-RTA members by virtue of the
principle.
In the EC proposal there appear to be only two limitations on the
rights of the RTA to derogate from the National Treatment principle.
The first is that the intra-RTA agreement must be "aiming at a higher
degree of liberalization." This is only to say that the RTA member
countries may not enter into a more restrictive, i.e., de-liberalizing,
agreement among themselves in derogation of their obligations under
the Code. Reasons why RTA members might want to inhibit their
own internal trade (while perhaps extending more liberal trade terms
to non-RTA members) might be postulated, but it seems sufficient
here to note that the EC concedes that RTA members will not be permitted to do so. The second limitation is established by the first clause
of the proposal, which subjects the waiver to the condition that the
"resulting regime is on the whole no more restrictive than that resulting from previous commitments set out in its [each member's] schedule." This clause appears to be directed at establishing a condition
that while an individual RTA member may, by virtue of an intra-RTA
"liberalization" agreement, adopt measures which are in fact more restrictive than its commitments as set out in its Code schedule, the sum
of RTA member liberalizing measures will be as favorable to nonRTA members as would have been the separate member country commitments under the Code. The reference to "previous commitments
set out in its schedule""' must be viewed as limiting each individual
country's more generalized National Treatment commitment to those
specific commitments set forth in its schedule. If this were not the
case, a right extended to RTA members to enter into more highly liberalizing agreements would not be meaningful, since the benefits of
such agreements would automatically be extended to non-RTA
members.
The "on the whole" language in the EC's draft waiver is borrowed
from the basic article XXIV exemption which says that an RTA (customs union) external tariff wall may not "on the whole" exceed the
tariff wall of each member state prior to the formation of the common
81. Under the EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, parties to the Code will specify in a schedule their commitments to eliminate measures inconsistent with the National Treatment principle.
Id. at art. XVII(2). The existing degree of compliance with the National Treatment principle is
not to be decreased by the introduction of new measures. Id. at art. XVII(3). However, since
this requirement is not directly incorporated in a country's "schedule" of commitments, it is not
clear that the EC intends this requirement to be a part of each RTA member's commitments for
the purpose of evaluating "on the whole" compliance by the RTA.
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external tariff wall. 82 When the EC first erected its common tariff
wall, much controversy arose with respect to how multiple Member
State tariff walls should be aggregated to determine a common "on the
whole" tariff barrier involving a myriad of products crossing a multiplicity of boundaries. 83 In the context of a Services Code, the potential
practical application of the "on the whole" test staggers the imagination. There appears to be an underlying assumption that it is possible
to determine what the existing economic impact of service barriers are
and, in addition, to determine on an objective basis what the effect of
eliminating these barriers would be. This is not the case. Professor
Jackson employs an element of understatement in his recent book
when he observes that "[s]cholars have tried to estimate the 'tariffequivalent' effect of the various non-tariff measures, but have found
' 84
this to be no easy task."

It is clear that the most sophisticated analytic tools are unable to
describe with accuracy either the current effect of non-tariff barriers
("NTBs") on trade in services or the impact of removing these barriers. 85 The United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), with tremendous incentive to quantify foreign NTBs affecting trade in
services, is perhaps the most articulate spokesperson for the impracti82. See discussion of "on the whole" language in article XXIV in text accompanying notes
32 and 33, supra.
83. The history of the EC controversy, which was never resolved, is described by Professor
Jackson in LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 610-18. The controversy ultimately boiled down to
the question whether the tariffs "applicable" prior to the formation of the RTA meant the
"bound" tariff commitments of the Member States in the General Agreement or the actual tariffs
in place at the time of formation. Dam points out that quite a few statistical calculation
problems which arise in attempting to determine the general incidence of tariffs remain unresolved. Dam, supra note 1,at 619-22.
84. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 130.
85. Jackson cites two attempts to measure non-tariff barriers affecting trade in goods and to
provide a conceptual framework for such measurements. A herculean conceptual study by
Deardorff and Stern of the University of Michigan, while tentatively attempting to quantify the
impact of NTBs, is carefully worded by the authors to make it clear that much research would be
necessary before economic studies of NTBs could be used as a decision-making basis in trade
negotiations. Deardorff & Stern, Methods of Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers, UNCTAD/
ST/MD/28, at 46-47 (1985). Likewise, a study by Morici and Megna which attempts to quantify
the tariff equivalent impact of U.S. NTBs states:
Estimating the tariff equivalents of NTBs is a difficult and inexact exercise, especially when
the objective is to obtain measurements across all of a country's practices and manufacturing industries. Many judgments were necessary, and the authors emphasize that many of the
results reported here are order of magnitude estimates of the restrictive effects of many U.S.
NTBs. (emphasis in original)
P. MORICI & L. MEGNA, U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES AFFECTING INDUSTRIAL TRADE 2 (1983).
The task of estimating the effect of NTBs on trade in services presents obstacles even more
formidable than those considered by the two studies cited above because precise data on trade in
services is not available. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS

USTR FTB

REPORT].
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cability of the task.8 6 In its 1990 Foreign Trade Barriers Report, following a lengthy discussion of the difficulties inherent in attempting to
estimate the impact of NTBs on U.S. exports of goods,8 7 the USTR
states:
The same limitations that affect the ability to estimate the impact of foreign barriers upon U.S. goods exports apply to U.S. services exports.
Furthermore, the trade data on services exports are extremely limited
and of questionable reliability. For these reasons, estimates of the impact
88
of foreign barriers on trade in services are also difficult to compute.
Starting with the understanding that the quantitative impact of NTBs
on trade in services are not presently determinable and that there is no
reason to believe that this situation will be remedied in the near future,
it does not require an immense leap of logic to conclude that it is impracticable to evaluate the impact of the NTBs of each RTA member
in order to determine whether an RTA's non-tariff barriers "on the
whole" are no more restrictive than the individual commitments of its
member states. For this reason the EC's proposal is unworkable.
Even if it were possible to calculate in some manner the Community's "on the whole" services barriers and thereby establish an objective minimum level of service liberalization which the EC would agree
to extend to non-Member countries, allowing the Community as a regional entity to liberalize its internal market without any apparent limitation on the extent to which it may refuse to pass this liberalization
on to non-Members - except that the EC must "on the whole" meet
its specific minimum Services Code commitments - raises important
questions: Why should the United States (with an internal market
roughly comparable to that of the EC) liberalize its market for the
benefit of Community service providers beyond the United States' "on
the whole" commitment in its Services Code schedule if the United
States could get by with the minimum commitment set forth in its
schedule? Why should Japan? If the international trading system is
based on reciprocity, would not the United States and Japan be acting
reasonably in refusing the EC National Treatment beyond that level
committed in the Services Code so long as the EC based its participation on an "on the whole" commitment?
86. See USTR FTB REPORT, supra note 85, at 3-4.
87. The USTR FTB REPORT, after discussing the difficulties in estimating the impact of tariff
barriers, states: "The task of estimating the impact of nontariff measures on U.S. exports is far
more difficult since there is no readily available estimate of the additional cost these restrictions
impose upon imports." Id. at 4.
88. Id. With respect to NTBs in general, the Report states: "[I]t is difficult to quantify the
impact upon U.S. exports (or commerce) of other foreign practices such as government procurement policies, nontransparent standards, or inadequate intellectual property rights protection."
Id. Similar observations were made in the USTR's 1989 FTB Report.
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There is a sharp distinction between the RTA exemption when applied to the trade of goods and when applied to the trade of services.
When article XXIV permitted the EC to remove internal tariff barriers
while erecting a common tariff wall, the goods of the United States
and Japan were affected only to the extent that they were subject to a
one-time entry fee into the internal market (payable at the border) to
which goods produced within the EC were not subject. 89 Goods produced in the EC achieved a cost advantage only to the extent that they
moved between Member countries in a manner that they had not previously, while goods produced for consumption within a particular
Community Member and consumed there obtained no new advantage.
A foreign producer shipping goods into a discrete Community Member State was affected little if at all by the change to a common tariff
wall; it was disadvantaged only to the extent that its intra-Member
State competitors were able to achieve better economies of scale in
their intra-Community export operations. Once a foreign producer
had paid the common external tariff and its goods had entered a Community Member State, that producer and its goods enjoyed the benefits
of tariff-free transit throughout the Community and was subject to no
additional disadvantage.
Failure to grant National Treatment in the context of the services
market means something entirely different. If National Treatment is
not provided in the Community country in which services are introduced from abroad, this will give rise to an immediate disadvantage in
that market, equivalent to an immediate common external tariff disadvantage. Moreover, the immediate entry barrier disadvantage will not
necessarily be compensated for by unrestricted access on a National
Treatment basis to "transshipment" markets elsewhere in the Community. If the National Treatment requirement is not adhered to, external service providers might be treated in a discriminatory manner
on a continuing basis for the duration of their presence in the Community, both within their country-of-entry and in other Member States,
and therefore achieve no particular advantage from having entered the
market. The continuing impact would not likely be measurable by an
objective yardstick, such as the percentage duty imposed by an external wall tariff charge. It might instead be composed of innumerable
and hardly measurable intangibles such as subjection to prolonged licensing procedures, inability to obtain Community-wide licensing,
89. As Professor Jackson has recently observed, current tariff levels under the GATT "arguably constitute more of a 'sales tax', or a nuisance, than an import barrier. Producers who can
become sufficiently more efficient can 'hurdle the tariff' by selling at a lower cost to offset the
tariff." J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 117.

GATT and the European Community

Fall 1990]

lack of access to leased telecommunications lines on an equivalent basis, continuing higher public telecommunications rate charges and
other factors. An RTA waiver formula which permits the EC to
adopt additional liberalizing measures with no limitation on the extent
to which such measures may discriminate in favor of local enterprises
may lead to a significant actual or perceived imbalance between the
benefits and obligations pertaining to RTA members and those pertaining to non-RTA members.
A perception by the United States, Japan and other EC trading
partners that the Community is refusing to grant access to its liberalized market beyond the strict terms of the Services Code, based on the
RTA waiver in article III of its proposal, would lead most likely to a
reversion to strict reciprocity as a basis for future services liberalization concessions. Both the United States and Japan would abide by
their strict commitments in the Code, but refuse to grant external parties access to further liberalized markets without reciprocal concessions. While such a result would not spell the end of the GATT
trading system (which involves a high degree of dependence on
"global reciprocity"), it would certainly slow the process of global liberalization. Each country undertaking a liberalization of its internal
market would find itself negotiating with each of its trading partners
to determine the overall new balance of reciprocal concessions. An
alternative formula for evaluating discriminatory RTA measures is
required.
V.

A NEW

FORMULA FOR EVALUATING

A.

RTA

MEASURES

Premises

This proposal for a new formula by which to evaluate RTA measures involving trade in services (and other GATT regimes not involving trade in goods) is based on certain premises. First, as discussed
above, the proposal put forward by the EC in the GATT services negotiating group is both unworkable and unwise. It is unworkable because it would be exceedingly difficult to evaluate the impact of service
liberalization regimes in individual RTA members as required to make
a determination that the total RTA liberalization package is "on the
whole" compatible with each individual RTA member's schedule of
commitments. It is unwise because internal barriers to trade in services brought about by derogations from the National Treatment principle may have a far more pervasive impact than derogations from the
MFN principle with respect to tariff barriers and trade in goods. The
implementation of such derogations, without meaningful limitation, is
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likely to cause either an actual or perceived imbalance vis-a-vis the
EC's trading partners which would be likely to lead in turn to a system
of liberalization based on strict reciprocity. Since strict reciprocity is
more easily determined on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, a
liberalization program based on case-by-case reciprocity may result in
a shift from the GATT goal of comprehensive global liberalization to
one of fragmented country-by-country and region-by-region liberalization. One of the principal goals of and justifications for the GATT
system is the avoidance of country-by-country negotiations focusing
on narrow interests.
A second premise underlying the evaluation criteria proposed below is that evaluating RTA discriminatory acts in new areas by invoking the classic economic criteria of whether such discrimination is
predominantly "trade creating" or "trade diverting," while elegant in
concept, would be at least as unworkable as the EC proposal. The
state of the art in economic analysis simply does not permit an objective "scientific" determination - and certainly not a determination in
advance - of the extent to which the imposition either of a discrete
non-tariff internal discrimination or a complex system of internal discriminations will affect service providers in the three relevant markets
(i.e., the territory in which services are at present locally provided, the
RTA territories from which services might be provided if discriminations in the first territory were removed on an intra-RTA basis, and
the non-RTA territories from which services into the first territory are
currently provided or would be provided but for the preferences
granted to providers within the RTA). It is therefore impractical to
suggest that RTA discriminatory preferences be approved or disapproved on the basis of a determination of whether their predominant
effect will be trade creating or trade diverting.
The third, and perhaps most important, set of premises is that: (a)
RTAs will require some measure of flexibility to adopt intra-RTA
preferences which are not extended to external territories, and (b) it is
preferable to limit RTA internal discrimination in order to preserve
the liberal international trading system embodied in the GATT. This
set of premises is most important because it is possible to conclude
from the foregoing discussion that any RTA derogation from the National Treatment principle is unwarranted. By excluding an RTA
waiver provision from its Services Code proposal, the USTR impliedly
signalled its adoption of such a conclusion. 90 This conclusion, however, may ignore certain legitimate interests of RTAs such as the EC.
90. U.S. Services Proposal, supra note 46, which contains no reference to special treatment for
RTAs.
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The general principle of the GATT mandating National Treatment
for goods of foreign origin is applicable to GATT Contracting Parties,
a term which, at least at the formation of the GATT, referred only to
individual countries. 9 1 Each of these individual members of the
GATT was and is presumed to be competent within its own territory
for the implementation of GATT commitments. 92 Each member is
thus obliged to apply the National Treatment principle throughout its
territory, even though this does not (as in the case of the United
States) preclude the adoption of internal regulations respecting different subterritories of the "federal" state so long as such disparate treatment applies alike to nationals and non-nationals. For purposes of the
GATT, individual countries like the United States are considered unitary actors which have since the inception of the arrangement had the
authority and power to liberalize their internal market and to extend
National Treatment to foreign countries.
Prospective members of an RTA, on the other hand, are considering the mechanisms by which they may achieve some form of market
unification and perhaps some degree of federalization of authority.
RTAs do not share the same goals. Some, such as the EC, may envision a centralization of decision-making authority in institutions such
as the EC Council and Commission. Others, such as the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement may envision very little in the way of centralized decision-making authority. No RTA, however, prior to its inception, has central authority with the power to mandate unitary
regulation through different national territories; and only after the inception of the RTA can its institutions initiate the process (in light of
its goals) of unifying the internal market and applying (to the extent
contemplated by its members) uniform trade regulation in a manner to
which the federal State is accustomed. Thus, during the process of its
unification and federalization, an RTA cannot be (and perhaps therefore should not be) considered the precise equivalent of an individual
GATT Contracting Party, because its institutions lack the authority
91. The EC is technically not a GATT Contracting Party, although it is treated like one for
almost all purposes. Petersmann, The EEC as a GA TT Member - Legal Conflicts Between
GATT Law and European Community Law, in EC AND GATT, supra note 1.
92. This flows not explicitly from the text of the General Agreement, but rather from fundamental principles of international law which view the State as a unitary actor responsible for its
own internal constitutive processes. See E. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW (8th ed. 1955) with respect to the rule that sovereign States as "international persons" are
represented by one central political authority (sec. 85), regarding the rights and obligations of the
sovereign State within its own territory (secs. 123-25) and the "well-established principle that a
State cannot invoke its municipal legislation as a reason for avoiding its international obligations" (sec 155d). Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[a]
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty." S. ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at app. 1 (1989).
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and power to accomplish what the institutions of a separate country
may achieve.
As an RTA acts to unify, federalize and liberalize its market, it
encounters certain risks. One of these risks, viewed from the internal
RTA standpoint, is that enterprises in whose interests the liberaliza93
tion efforts are primarily made, i.e., those located within the RTA,
will face immediate competition for shares of a unified internal market
from enterprises coming from outside the RTA. A certain anxiety is
likely to arise on the part of RTA officials - and this appears to be the
case with the EC Commission - that foreign enterprises with greater
experience operating in larger domestic markets (as well as international markets) will be able to react to market unification and liberalization measures more quickly than RTA-based enterprises, and may
overwhelm existing and emerging RTA enterprises if new internal regulations assume that all enterprises will be treated on an equivalent
basis.
It may well be argued that fear of market liberalization and opening -

even if reasonable

-

should not justify an RTA's derogation

from immediate fulfillment of the GATT's National Treatment principle. Each individual GATT Contracting Party has its own anxiety
about the impact of market opening, which does not translate into justification for failing to apply the National Treatment principle. The
essential question is this: does the global trading system gain an incremental measure of value from the unification and liberalization of a
formerly fragmented market such as to justify granting that new union
some remedial measure in fulfilling its ultimate GATT obligations?
If the answer is no and the GATT as a whole elects to deny the
RTA any temporary measure of special treatment, then the RTA
which nevertheless wishes to pursue market unification and trade liberalization policies has three basic alternatives: first, it may follow the
the generally applicable GATT rules and accept the risk; second, it
may withdraw from the GATT framework and concentrate on its own
development priorities; and third, it may pretend to accept the GATT
rules yet ignore them in practice. Only the first of these outcomes
would appear to have any appeal with respect to non-member countries; yet, even if preferable, it may be that such an outcome is not very
likely in view of political and economic factors affecting RTA decision-makers.
93. This observation is intended as a statement of political reality, i.e., that as a general
proposition RTA governments act first and foremost with a view toward improving conditions
within the market for the benefit of local industry, and not for the benefit of third-country
enterprises.
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On the other hand, if non-member countries perceive a long-term
benefit from a unified and liberalized RTA market, then the grant of a
temporary waiver from strict adherence to the National Treatment
principle may be an acceptable, if not strictly preferred, alternative. In
other words, if a group of independent, sovereign countries decides to
undertake the "federalization" of its trading system, to expand the size
of and liberalize the regulatory environment within its completed market (and these activities will involve significant inter-RTA variations
in degree), it may be preferable to permit the group a period during
which to undertake these activities with some relief from the external
demands to which the GATT Contracting Parties are normally subject. An underlying assumption behind such limited tolerance is that
the unification or harmonization of trade regulation is ultimately beneficial to the global trading community as a whole, or is at least not
harmful to the community, and that the potential short-term adverse
consequences arising from the creation of temporary internal preferences can be kept to a bare minimum by placing strict constraints on
discriminatory measures.
A waiver during the period of market unification and federalization must be viewed as a temporary measure, i.e., limited in duration.
If the justification for permitting an RTA to derogate from certain
fundamental GATT principles is that the RTA is undergoing a positive transformation the benefits of which will ultimately inure to nonRTA members, the justification loses its force as the transformation
takes effect. Therefore, in no event should extension of a right to derogate from a principle as central to the GATT as that of National
Treatment extend beyond an initial phase of the RTA's formation, after which it would be deemed to be "completed," except with respect
to very strictly confined circumstances involving safeguard justifications already recognized by the GATT. Because of the risks to the
global trading system associated with creating isolated regions with
special and more beneficial rules, derogations must be strictly limited
to those which are demonstrated by the RTA to be essential to its
completion. It is on the basis of the foregoing premises that the following proposal is made.
B.

A New Formula

On the surface, the following proposal is quite straightforward. It
is suggested that RTA discriminations in new areas such as services
and investment measures be evaluated by the criteria of "necessity."
An RTA exemption in a new GATT Services Code might read:
Code Parties which are members of customs unions and free trade areas
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(within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement) (hereafter "regional trading arrangements") shall be entitled.
to adopt as between themselves agreements for the purpose of achieving
more liberalized internal markets and shall be entitled to implement
those agreements by means of laws and regulations when such agreements are necessary to the formation or maintenance of said regional
trading arrangements. The benefits of the aforesaid agreements shall be
extended (by complete application where possible and otherwise progressively) to Code Parties which are not members of the regional trading

arrangements which have adopted them as soon as the necessity for limiting their general application has expired. Liberalization agreements
which have as their predominant purpose the creation of preferences in
favor of enterprises established within regional trading arrangements
shall be presumed to be not necessary within the meaning of this
paragraph.

In addition to the foregoing, a new RTA waiver 94 would include: (a) a
provision requiring notification of an agreement to the appropriate
parties (e.g., parties to the Services Code); (b) an avenue for parties
opposed to the agreement to make recommendations addressing objectionable provisions or to refuse a waiver to the agreement; and (c) a
dispute settlement procedure afforded either by the Code in question
or the GATT General Agreement structure so that issues arising out
of adopted but allegedly "unapproved" discriminations could be addressed. 9 5 The policy premise favoring the minimization of RTA derogations from fundamental GATT principles leads to a further
recommendation that, within the framework of the selected GATT
dispute settlement procedure, the burden of proving the necessity of a
specific RTA activity should be placed on the RTA seeking to justify
96
its conduct.
94. In order to accommodate adoption of the Code by the EC, a definitional provision should
be added to the Code which makes it clear that, with respect to the RTA waiver provision,
reference should also be had to agreements made between member states of an RTA which are
not independent parties to the Code, and to measures adopted by the RTA as a regional organization (recognizing that the EC and its Members may adopt the Code as a "mixed" agreement).
95. A number of the Codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round incorporate their own independent dispute settlement mechanisms. See 0. LONG, supra note 4, at 78-80, 87. For a general
discussion of existing GATT dispute settlement procedures, see id. at 71-88. For an excellent
analysis of the potential for improvement in the GATT dispute settlement system, see Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in InternationalEconomic Organizations:ComparativeAnalysis and Proposals
for Strengthening the GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedures, in EC AND GATT, supra note 1, at
285.
96. Such an allocation of the burden of proof may help to counter any institutional bias in
favor of conceding waivers to RTAs. This proposal to place the burden of proof on the party
seeking to justify exceptional conduct is also consistent with the Procedure followed by the
GATT Panel in the EC/U.S. section 337 dispute (Panel Report, supra note 40) which, in considering the GATT-legality of U.S. legislation under the National Treatment standard, said, "I]t is
incumbent on the contracting party applying differential treatment to show that, in spite of such
differences, the no less favorable treatment standard of Article III is met." (emphasis added) Id.
at 52, para. 5.11.
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In notifying a "derogating" agreement to the appropriate parties,

an RTA should be required to include a binding commitment with
respect to the maximum duration of the discriminatory feature(s) of
such agreement, beyond which time the agreement would be presumed
to violate the RTA's GATT commitments. Such a notification of
commitment as to duration might also include a timetable (where fea97
sible) for the progressive elimination of discrimination.
C.

Defining Necessity

The proposed formula incorporates the concept of necessity as the
test according to which RTA discriminations will be evaluated. 98 The
word "necessary" is subject to many meanings depending on the context of its use, ranging from "absolutely indispensable" to the accomplishment of a task to "convenient or desirable" in the
accomplishment of a task. 9 9 In the context of determining the permissibility of RTA derogations from the rules of a GATT Services Code,
"necessary" should be synonymous with "indispensable to the accomplishment of the formation and maintenance of an RTA."'' ° How97. The proposed formula refers to measures necessary for both the "formation" and "maintenance" of the RTA. Although the vast majority of necessary derogating measures should expire upon completion of a "formation" phase of the RTA, it may be that certain measures (such
as those relating to security) will have a more permanent character. Thus there are certain measures for which a binding duration commitment would not be expected.
98. Judge Koopmans was particularly helpful in developing the author's views with respect
to the approach taken by the proposed formula.
99. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "necessary" as follows:

This word must be considered in the connection in which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may
import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to
the end sought. It is an adjective expressing degrees, and may express mere convenience or
that which is indispensable or an absolute physical necessity. It may mean something which
in the accomplishment of a given object cannot be dispensed with, or it may mean something reasonably useful or proper, and of greater or lesser benefit or convenience, and its
force and meaning must be determined with relation to the particular object sought.
Id. at 928 (5th ed. 1979).
100. The most prominent appearance of the word "necessary" in U.S. jurisprudence is in the
"necessary and proper" clause of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" both the specific legislative powers granted to Congress in article I, § 8, and "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. The meaning of the "necessary and proper clause" was the subject of an
historic debate between Jefferson and Hamilton, with Jefferson arguing that its meaning should
be limited to "absolutely indispensable" and Hamilton arguing in favor of "useful." While Hamilton's position eventually prevailed in the Supreme Court (in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-05 (2d ed. 1988)), the

context of that debate was entirely different from that under discussion here. With respect to
interpreting the "necessary and proper" clause of the U.S. Constitution, the central issue was
whether the Congress as the federal legislature would have greater or lesser powers with respect
to the state legislatures. In adopting a liberal construction of the clause, the Supreme Court was
effectively extending the scope of federal powers. In the context of RTA derogations from the
general rules of the GATT, the GATT General Agreement acts as the federal global trade consti-
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ever, even if necessity might generally be defined as constituting an
essential or indispensable requirement (evidencing a far more compelling justification than mere desirability), it is obvious that "necessary"
will not through this sole clarification become self-defining. Rather,
some general guideposts in the form of supplemental legislative history
or regulation will be required, and decisions by authoritative decisionmakers such as RTA government officials, the Code Parties and
GATT panelists should be expected to flesh out the concept. Given
the complex nature of the integration process and its relationship to
the global trading system, it would be unproductive to attempt to set
out in advance and attempt to evaluate all of the types of discrimination in each economic sector in which they might arise. Nevertheless,
it may be useful to discuss some general ideas about the areas in which
discriminatory acts might be justified as necessary.
First, the effective establishment of RTA political institutions may
require regional discriminations directed toward the creation and support of institutions such as parliaments, executive councils, and administrative and judicial bodies which might well be justified as
"necessary." If, for example, the creation of an effective regional central banking administration required that regionally-owned banks be
given emergency access to funds that could not reasonably be extended
to banks owned by foreign nationals, then discrimination in favor of
providing such access only to banks owned by regional nationals
might be justified during a transition period in which regional banking
stability was to be achieved.
Second, if an RTA were to adopt a common foreign and defense
policy, regional discriminations for security reasons would be justified
by necessity. For example, service consultants to the common defense
establishment might be limited to "regional nationals" for security
reasons.
Third, regional preferences established to promote the economic
development of impoverished areas or peoples might be justified by
necessity. Therefore, certain service industry sectors or contract opportunities in designated impoverished regions might be limited to
members of a specific regional class.
Fourth, regional discriminations adopted as emergency safeguard
measures for reasons set forth in the EC Services Code proposal, such
as the prevention of immediate and severe economic dislocations or
the resolution of a balance of payments crisis, might be justified by
tution, while the separate RTAs may be analogized to the states. Therefore, liberally construing
the "necessary" clause of the proposed RTA exemption would be the equivalent of extending
states' rights at the expense of federal authority.
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necessity. Also, RTA discriminations necessary to remedy abuses of
dominant position may be justifiable. 0 1
Derogations from the National Treatment principle will, virtually
by definition, operate in favor of RTA-based enterprises and give them
some measure of comparative advantage vis-a-vis non-RTA-based enterprises. With this in mind, it is important and difficult to consider a
basis for distinguishing RTA measures which have as their motive a
successful completion of the internal market and those which are intended as protectionist. There may be a fine line between measures
which legitimately take into account local infrastructure requirements
and economic conditions (and which may operate temporarily to facilitate adaptation by locally-based enterprises to a completed internal
market), and those measures intended to block foreign enterprises
from fair access to the same completed market. Generally speaking,
an RTA should be encouraged to use its competition laws to protect
local enterprises (and consumers) from abuses of dominant position by
foreign enterprises. Competition laws are far preferable to trade laws
as a mechanism for protecting local enterprises because competition
laws minimize trade distortion by affecting only the oppressive actors.
Protectionist trade measures taken in the name of local ownership distort trade and capital flows which should otherwise produce the optimum allocation of global resources. The protection of RTA
enterprises from foreign competition should not as a general proposition be a legitimate goal of an RTA waiver. On the other hand, measures which may have as their effect the maintenance of a "level playing
field" for an interim period may be tolerated, if not encouraged. With
this fine distinction in mind, the proposed RTA waiver formula provides that measures with the predominant purpose of protecting local
enterprises will be presumed to be unnecessary. This brief formula
will, however, require additional elaboration, perhaps aided by analogy to other trade laws intended to maintain level playing fields, e.g.,
anti-dumping and subsidy laws. Anti-dumping laws which distinguish
"fair" and "unfair" foreign trade necessarily have a protectionist impact vis-A-vis foreign traders seeking to elude the basic laws of competition. In the anti-dumping area, there is a fine line between fair
aggressive competition and unfair below market value cut-throat competition. 102 With respect to RTA activities permitted by the proposed
101. As indicated in note 37, supra, the National Treatment principle in the GATT is not an
absolute, and much of what is suggested here may be roughly coincidental with the public policy
derogations generally permitted from the National Treatment principle in the General Agreement. This suggests that the justification for RTA derogations may need to be nearly as compelling as derogations by individual Contracting Parties to the GATT.
102. The analogy to the anti-dumping and subsidy laws does not point to a specific test for
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waiver, necessity relating to positive attempts to market unification, as
opposed to "mere expediency" at the expense of foreign competition,
03
should guide decision-makers in their evaluation of legitimacy.
D.

The EC as a Model

In the balance of this article, discussion will largely focus on the

policies of the European Community.'

°4

The EC is by far the most

successful model of large-scale regional economic integration. It has
developed refined decision-making institutions at the legislative, executive, adjudicatory and administrative levels, developed a coordinated
external trade policy, and presented proposals with respect to the postUruguay Round treatment of RTAs within the GATT framework.
Moreover, there is every indication that the size and influence of the
EC will continue to expand. Already far more influential in the sphere
of trade policy than its twelve member countries would suggest (by
virtue, inter alia, of the EFTA and Lome arrangements),10 5 the EC
figures prominently in the economic plans of the emerging Eastern European economies.
E.

Telecommunications as a Case

In addition to narrowing the scope of the following discussion to
the EC, this article will focus on efforts within the GATT to liberalize
the international telecommunications trade and the relationship be-

tween that process, the EC telecommunications liberalization process
the RTA waiver regarding predominant purpose; rather, it illustrates that trade policy-makers
have successfully dealt with policy concepts distinguishing conduct taken with trade-enhancing
versus trade-destructive intent.
103. It is doubtful that preservation of cultural identity is a valid justification for RTA discrimination. A recent example of such discrimination is the EC's directive on television programming content. Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcast Activities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 23 (1989); see Presburger & Tyler, Television without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 495 (1990). All manner of RTA discrimination as
well as national discrimination could be justified on "cultural" grounds - including discrimination in favor of Japanese rice growers, German beer brewers, French wine makers and Belgian
chocolate makers. No doubt, each country or RTA has an interest in preserving its local character. Preservation achieved by protectionist measures, however, impairs the efficient allocation of
global resources, which is the goal of market liberalization. Jackson notes that the choice of a
society to pursue "noneconomic" goals is certainly valid - probably desirable - and ponders
that perhaps the only demand that outsiders might reasonably make on that society is that it
absorb the whole economic cost for that choice. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 19.
104. An excellent non-technical survey of the current state of the EC (including its relationships with the EFTA countries) appears in An Expanding Universe. A Survey of the European
Community, ECONOMIST (July 7, 1990) (insert).
105. See Riesenfeld, supra note 21, at 356. For a report on the upcoming commencement of
negotiations between the EC and EFTA toward the creation of a European Economic Space
(EES), see 30 E.F.T.A. BULLETIN 1 (Oct. 1989 - Mar. 1990).
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and non-EC telecommunications sectors. International trade in telecommunications is a useful analytical tool because it involves: (a)
trade in both goods and services; (b) an area historically subject to
intense government regulation (including outright government ownership); (c) substantial issues of public policy (involving, e.g., employment and security); (d) disparity between developed and developing
countries; and (e) an area in which the EC has been implementing
significant measures to liberalize its internal market.
VI.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

The establishment of a readily accessible and efficient global telecommunications network would generate obvious benefits for global
economic efficiency as well as the distribution (and presumably the
creation) of knowledge. 106 There can be little doubt that each country
in the global community will be better off if its scientists and engineers
have ready access to databases in other countries and the capacity to
exchange information freely with each other; that global business will
be more efficient if enterprises are able to transmit and receive information concerning production and shipping schedules, inventory
levels, sources of supply and pricing more rapidly; and that individuals
will be more knowledgeable, and perhaps better able to maintain more
lasting interpersonal relations, if all are enabled to communicate more
freely. A multitude of blessings seem to be inherent in an open and
07
efficient global telecommunications network.
Without doubt, not everyone perceives the global network as an
unalloyed good and, of course, much depends on who controls the
106. Primary sources regarding the telecommunications sector and the liberalization process
include J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, WHEN COUNTRIES TALK (1988); H. UNGERER & N. CosTELLO, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE (1988); LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (S. Schoff ed. 1990); Cowhey, The InternationalTelecommunications Regime:
The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology, 44 INT'L ORG. 169 (1990). "Telecommunications in Europe," written by the Division Head of the EC Telecommunications Policy Directorate, is an improved version of the Commission's Green Paper on the telecommunications
sector. Towards a Dynamic EuropeanEconomy, Green Paperon the Development of the Common
Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, E.C. COMM'N Docs., COM(87) 290
final [hereinafter Green Paper]. While many of the references to "Telecommunications in Europe" could similarly be made to the Green Paper, this article will refer to the former except
where a direct reference to the Green Paper is necessary. See also Report by Independent Consultants to DG XIIIF. Perspectivesfor Advanced Communications in Europe, I PACE 89 (1989);
Netting the Future:A Survey of Telecommunications, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 1990) (insert).
107. The observations in the text concerning the potential benefits of an open global telecommunications network would appear to require little secondary confirmation. However, for a
somewhat less rhapsodic but nevertheless compelling perspective on the importance to global
welfare of such a network, see J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, supra note 106, at 4-9. Aronson and
Cowhey note that the world market for telecommunications and computer products and services
in 1990 is estimated to have a value of $831 billion, and that the annual worldwide growth rate in
that market between 1984 and 1990 has been 11%. Id. at 7.
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network and how it is used.' 0 8 Certainly there is a "dark side," in
which the efficient telecommunications network becomes the most important tool of "Big Brother." The potential for mischief points to
certain areas where regulation, even in a relatively harmonious world,
is to be expected. 0 9 Individuals will want to ensure that they are not
listened to by uninvited intruders (be they governmental or otherwise),
businesses will wish to avoid the misappropriation of their proprietary
knowledge, and, of course, all but a few will wish to avoid the concentration of power to control the global network in the hands of a dominant provider. 10
While some regulation will always be required, the telecommunications sector is one in which the benefits of ultimate global liberalization seem indisputable. The issue is not whether this liberalization is
ultimately desirable from a public welfare standpoint, but how it can
be achieved within a framework of entrenched interests which include
not only government owners, but vast numbers of employees who may
be dependent on certain features of the existing regimes. This is certainly true in the EC, where the vast majority of telecommunications
providers are government-owned monopolies - PTTs and RTTs, also
referred to as telecommunications administrations ("TAs") - which
represent one of the largest single pools of employment in the
Community. ' I'
A.

Basic Structure in the EC

A few basic observations about the structure of the telecommunications industry in the EC are necessary for an understanding of its
relationship to the international trade regulatory scheme. The telecommunications market is divided between goods and services. Goods
include infrastructure equipment such as telephone cables and switch108. Issues with respect to who has access to information and under what conditions in the
context of the international telecommunications sector are generally referred to under the rubric
of "transborder data flow" issues. These issues are briefly summarized and citations provided in
J. ARONSON AND P. COWHEY, supra note 106, at 99-110. There are fundamental tensions
among the business and scientific communities which wish to maximize the open flow of data,
individuals who wish to secure their privacy and governments which wish to regulate both.
109. Professor Rigaux presents an excellent discussion of the rules which legal institutions
have developed to protect the privacy of individuals and makes some insightful observations
about the need for a new balancing of power between the State and the individual in the computer age in Rigaux, The Protection of Private Life, in LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 106, at 663.
110. As discussed supra at text accompanying note 102, competition rules will play a vital
role in preventing and correcting abuses of a newly-liberalized global telecommunications
network.
11. In 1986, telecommunications administrations in the EC accounted for the combined
employment of 922,000 persons. H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 106, at 28-29. This

figure does not include employment by non-TA telecommunications service providers.
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ing equipment, user equipment such as terminals (e.g., telephones) and

processing equipment (e.g., computers) which is used both by service
providers and users. Services are divided into two primary categories:
basic services and value-added services ("VAS")." 12 Although the dividing line is not universally agreed upon, it is understood that basic
services have at their core voice telephony. 1 3 Basic service providers
argue that rudimentary additional services such as voice mail should
be included within the definition of basic services. 1 4 Value-added
services include everything that is not part of basic service, such as
data processing, electronic banking, electronic shopping, and the furnishing of databases.

In the EC until recently, the telecommunications market was virtually the exclusive province of government-owned monopolies. The
TAs owned the infrastructure equipment and had a monopoly on the
provision of basic services, the supply of terminal equipment and
terms of access to third-party VAS providers. In recent years the market has been significantly liberalized. The U.K. government privatized
its TA (while continuing to allow it part of a basic services monopoly),
and there has been some additional movement toward privatization. 115
In 1988, the Commission issued a Directive aimed at fully opening the
terminal equipment market to competition, depriving TAs of an important, long-standing equipment monopoly." t6 The Commission has
7
decreed that TA monopolies may extend only to voice telephony"
and that third-party providers must be given equitable access to the
112. See id. at 53-62; J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, supra note 106, at 86, 91-95.
113. The definitional problem is discussed in Green Paper, supra note 106, at 33-36.
114. Id. at 64-74 (fig. 13, para. B). The placement of the boundary line was very important
to EC TAs which, according to the Green Paper, were to be permitted to retain monopolies over
the provision of basic services in order to assure their financial viability. The Commission eventually limited TA monopolies to voice telephony. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
The boundary between basic services and VAS is also of great importance from the standpoint of
the GATT services agreement and telecommunications annex (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 158-65), which are almost certain to exclude the provision of "basic" services from
liberalization requirements.
115. H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 106, at 26-28; Green Paper,supra note 106, at
70-72, 1-79 (appendix). In the United Kingdom, the government retains a minority interest in
British Telecom; in Spain, the government holds a minority interest in Telefonica. See H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 106.

116. Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the Markets of Telecommunications TerminalEquipment, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 73 (1988), pursuant to which terminal equipment markets are to be completely opened (including the supply of first telephones) by
December 31, 1990.
117. Commission Directive of 28 June 1989 on Competition in the Marketsfor Telecommunications Services, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 192) 10 (1990), at art. 2. The Commission's authority to issue this sweeping Directive on the basis of its powers under article 90 of the Treaty of
Rome (to ensure that Member State monopolies comply with the EC's competition rules) is
subject to a challenge by a number of Member States now pending before the European Court of
Justice.
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TA networks.' 18 The Commission has decreed that TA equipment
procurement must be open to suppliers throughout the Community.11 9
At the suggestion of the Commission, the European Technical Stan-

dards Institute ("ETSI") was established (with membership open to
members of a variety of European organizations) 120 to develop com-

mon technical standards for the Community network. These measures, some of which have not been received enthusiastically by the
Member States, have as their end the promotion of a more open and
2
efficient EC telecommunications network.' '
The Commission's efforts to liberalize the telecommunications
market began with a few general references in the White Paper on
Completion of the Internal Market in 1992,122 which were elaborated

in great length in its Green Paper on Completion of the Telecommunications Sector.' 23 The Commission seems determined to create a tele-

communications infrastructure in the Community which will enhance
the entire process of integration.
B. Basic Structure in the GA TT

The telecommunications sector is a peculiar creature in the ex118. Council Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications
Services through the Implementation of the Open Network Provision (ONP), 33 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 192) 1 (1990) [hereinafter ONP Directive].
119. EC Press Release 4827/90 (Presse 19 - G) 22.11.90 (ton/PT/mmk).
120. The rather complex structure of ETSI is described by its Director, Professor Gagliardi,
in Gagliardi, ETSI: The European Standards Body for Telecommunications, in LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC ASPECTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 106, at 547. ETSI's membership is open
to European national administrations, public network operators, manufacturers, users (including
private service providers offering services to the public) and research bodies. Id. at 550. "NonEuropean organisations concerned with telecommunications may be invited to participate to [sic]
the meetings of the Technical Assembly as observers." Id. at 552.
121. As discussed supra note 117, a number of Member States have challenged the Commission's authority to issue blanket decrees directed at TA anti-competitive practices.
122. Completing the Internal Market (White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council), E.C. COMM'N DoCs., COM(85) 310 final. The White Paper identified the crucial role
of the telecommunications sector in achieving the objectives of the 1992 plan, and emphasized
the removal of national barriers on procurement (id. at 24) and the need to establish common
European telecommunications standards (both to integrate the industrial infrastructure of the
Community and to enhance international competitiveness) (id. at 19). The technical standards
area was specifically identified as one in which mutual Member State recognition would not
substitute for true harmonization. Id. at 19-20, 30-31.
123. Green Paper, supra note 106. In the words of the Commission: "The purpose of the
Green Paper on telecommunications is to initiate wide-ranging discussions with all those concerned so as to help the Community and its Member States to introduce necessary changes to
their systems of regulation." Id. at 1.
The Green Paper discussed the major economic role of the telecommunications sector in the
Community. By the year 2000, up to 7% of Community GDP would arise from the telecommunications sector, with more than 60% of employment "dependent" on the sector. Over 500
billion ECU would be invested in the sector. Id. at 1, 4. The Green Paper noted that the EC's
trade balance in telecommunications equipment had fallen precipitously vis-A-vis U.S. and Japanese competition. Id. at 158.
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isting GATT framework. Moving into the Uruguay Round, trade in
services has not been covered by the GATT. 24 The GATT has therefore not concerned itself with whether foreign service providers (either
basic or value-added) have access on any set of terms to the EC telecommunications market. 25 Since the preponderance of EC telecommunications equipment purchases are made by government-owned
monopolies, 26 such purchases would theoretically be covered by the
GATT Government Procurement Code. 127 However, the Govern124. See discussion of services proposals, supra at text accompanying notes 46-48. Professor
Jackson observed in 1969 that the General Agreement was basically intended to apply only to
goods. LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 511.
125. This is not intended to suggest that international telecommunications are presently unregulated. The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), and in particular its sub-body
the International Consultative Committee for Telephones and Telegraphs ("CCITT"), provide a
framework for the multilateral negotiation of telecommunications standards and the establishment of rates. See J. ARONSON AND P. COWHEY, supra note 106, at 45-49. However, the ITU
framework does not impose on its members an obligation to grant foreign providers access to
internal VAS markets on terms equivalent to those accorded national providers. For a detailed
description of the international regime governing telecommunications, see Cowhey, supra note
106. In addition to the ITU, international telecommunications issues are routinely negotiated on
a bilateral basis. For example, the United States has negotiated a series of bilateral agreements
referred to as IVANs (International Value Added Network Agreements) which establish the
rights of national enterprises to provide VAS in foreign countries and the regulation to which
such enterprises may be subject. The IVANs, which are generally negotiated on the basis of
reciprocity, have the primary drawback of creating a tremendously complex and unwieldy global
arrangement which impedes the development of an integrated global network. Moreover, while
IVANs may be attractive to the OECD countries, there is little incentive for the developing
countries to grant reciprocal access to their markets because they are unlikely to export VAS
services. Finally, the dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures both in the ITU and on a
bilateral basis are not terribly satisfactory, leading to a strong desire on the part of OECD-based
telecommunications services providers to reach a multilateral accord in the GATT.
126. Total investment by EC TAs on an annual basis-as of 1985 was 17 billion ECUs. Green
Paper,supra note 106, at 48.
It might be noted at this point that the status of a privatized yet State-chartered monopoly
such as British Telecom under the GATT is unclear. There is some room to argue that the "state
trading enterprise" provision of the GATT (article XVII), which recognizes the right of governments to confer "special privileges" on private enterprises in purchases and sales of imports (e.g.
to establish an import monopoly) permits chartered monopolies to discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers. Notwithstanding language in article XVII which appears to prohibit
discrimination by these State enterprises, Professor Jackson has alluded to GATT legislative
history which suggests that some discrimination against foreign suppliers may be permitted, and
has stated that there is no simple answer to the question whether article XVII permits a nation to
do through a State enterprise what it might not otherwise do under the GATT (i.e., discriminate). LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 338. Since Jackson was writing well before the adoption
of the Government Procurement Code, and since it is doubtful that the drafters of the Code
would have intended such a significant loophole to apply to quasi-governmental entities, it seems
unlikely that the United Kingdom would succeed in arguing that British Telecom is entitled to
discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers under the GATT. British Telecom and other private
telecommunications equipment purchasers in the EC are presumably subject to the GATT rules
which, arguably at least, preclude the implementation of "buy national" programs (except by
regional and local government entities which are not covered by the Procurement Code).
127. The Government Procurement Code applies to all procurement rules and practices, and
covers services incidental to the supply of products. Contracts above a threshold value of
150,000 SDR are covered. Products and suppliers from third countries must be accorded National Treatment and MFN status. Technical specifications may not be used to create artificial
barriers to trade. The Code establishes detailed tendering procedures designed to be transparent
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ment Procurement Code does not cover sectors in countries which
have not chosen to list them on an annex, and up until a recent listing

by Japan, no country had listed its telecommunications sector in the
annex, so that the EC TAs have not been subject to GATT government procurement regulation.128 In theory, the promulgation of technical standards is governed by the GATT Technical Standards
Code. 129 However, while under that Code the EC (as a "central government") as well as "regional bodies" within the EC (with respect to
technical standards) are covered, 130 so-called "non-governmental"
bodies are not directly subject to the Code (although the Code parties
and nondiscriminatory. Developing countries receive special treatment. GATT, BISD, 26 Supp.
33 (1980). See L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, WORLD TRADE AFTER THE
TOKYO ROUND 64-69, 236-58 (1984). The Government Procurement Code was adopted by the
EC, but not the Member States individually. See Hilf, The Application of GATT within Member
States of the Community, with Special Reference to the FRG, in EC AND GATT, supra note 1, at
153, 170-73.
128. A major issue of the Procurement Code negotiations concerned which governmental
bodies would be subject to the Code. The result was a procedure by which lists of covered entities
were established for each country and annexed to the Code. L. GLICK, supra note 127, at 30,
discusses the "offer and request" procedure whereby entities were selected. As of 1984, only
Japan (under intense pressure from the United States) had agreed to list its telecommunications
body (NTT, which was thereafter privatized) under the Code. Id. at 69; Note, The GA TT and

Services: Quill and Ink in an Age of Word Processors, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 288, 298 n.57
(1987). Thus, the Commission in its Green Paper indicated that the inclusion of telecommunications equipment under the umbrella of the Procurement Code would be a major issue in the
Uruguay Round. Green Paper,supra note 106, at 153.
129. GATT, BISD, 26 Supp. 8 (1980); see L. GLICK, supra note 127, at 73-79, 302-26. The
EC as well as each of its Member States are parties to the Standards Code. Hilf, supra note 127,
at 164-65, 168-70.
Leaving aside the critical issue of what bodies its rules are applicable to, the Technical Standards Code establishes the following rules (this discussion does not address conformance testing
and certification, which are also covered by the Code):
I. Technical rules and standards cannot be adopted with a view to creating trade barriers.
Unless existing or imminent international standards are "inappropriate" for, inter alia,
national security or public health reasons, the parties are to use such standards. Prior to
the adoption of new standards, the parties (at an appropriately early stage) are to publish
notice and allow a reasonable time for comments and consultation (to allow such comments to be taken into account). Technical standards must be published.
2. Each party is required to establish an enquiry point(s) from which other parties may
obtain information concerning technical standards, including information with respect to
regional bodies to which they are parties.
3. A committee on standards is established, as well as procedures for consultation and dispute settlement.
130. The definitional Annex to the Code provides: "In the case of the European Economic
Community the provisions governing central government bodies apply. However, regional bodies or certification systems may be established within the European Economic Community, and
in such cases would be subject to the provisions of this Agreement on regional bodies or certification systems." GATT Technical Standards Code, supra note 129, at annex, para. 6 (explanatory
note). "Regional bodies" within the EC are covered almost to the same extent as the EC itself
and individual country parties. Individual country parties to the Code (including the EC per the
definition above) are required only to take reasonable measures to ensure that regional bodies to
which they are members comply with the technical standards provisions. However, the individual country parties which are members of the regional bodies must comply with the Code when
adopting a regional standard, thereby ensuring coverage - although arguably leaving room for
delay in compliance through a dual adoption procedure.
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are to take reasonable measures to assure the compliance of non-gov-

ernmental parties).13 1 It is likely, though the matter is not free from
doubt, that the EC's new technical standards body, ETSI, will be considered a non-governmental body and therefore only indirectly subject
to the Technical Standards Code. 132 Moreover, as currently drafted
the Technical Standards Code refers to standards as they affect imported "products," so that technical standards with respect to the pro-

vision of telecommunications services are not covered.' 33 In sum,

while isolated pockets of EC telecommunications activities have been
subject to the GATT regulatory scheme prior to the Uruguay Round
34
(the recent coverage of the terminal equipment market stands out),'
for most intents the Uruguay Round effectively represents the poten-

tial commencement of GATT coverage of the telecommunications
sector.
C. Equipment in the GATT
Telecommunications equipment constitutes goods which have historically been covered by the GATT and therefore are not a "new
area" in the Uruguay Round. All GATT Contracting Parties, the EC
included, are required to adhere to the fundamental GATT principles
in the regulation of equipment imports. No country or region should
131. Pursuant to Article 4.1 of the Code:
Parties shall take such reasonable measures as are available to them to ensure that nongovernmental bodies within their territories comply with the provisions of Article 2 [covering technical standards] . . . In addition, Parties shall not take measures which have the
effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such non-governmental bodies to
act in a manner inconsistent with any of the provisions of Article 2.
In Telecommunications Council of the EC Comm'n, External Aspects of Telecommunications (Nov. 7, 1989), the Commission stated: "With regard to technical barriers to trade, the
Community is seeking to establish a better balance under the GATT agreement by extending its
provisions, in particular to the adoption of international standards and transparency of specifications adopted by sub-national and private standardisation bodies." Id. at 2.
132. ETSI is not a central, local or regional government body under the terms of the Code
and does not appear to be under the direct control of any such body. See GATT Technical
Services Code, supra note 129, at annex definitions 5-7. Standards adopted by ETSI are to have a
"voluntary" character. Gagliardi, supra note 120, at 553. It is an independent organization with
representatives from a variety of European organizations, including both government-owned
TAs and the private sector. ETSI's Technical Assembly will vote by a national weighted voting
procedure (id. at 552), though this alone would not appear to make it a governmental body.
While it is important to point out that ETSI will not be directly subject to the Code, the
"persuasive" language directed to the EC to take reasonable measures cannot be readily ignored.
There is little evidence that the EC intends to circumvent the Technical Standards Code, and it is
well to point out that most telecommunications standards-setting in the United States is done by
non-governmental bodies. Moreover, many technical standards-related concerns of non-EC enterprises appear to focus on what the EC Commission, not ETSI, might choose to do. The EC
Commission is clearly covered by the Code.
133. See GATT Technical Standards Code, supra note 129, at, e.g., art. 1.3.
134. The terminal equipment market became subject to general GAIT rules when the TA
monopoly over the market was dismantled.
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receive treatment more favorable than any other country or region,
except that in consequence of article XXIV, the EC countries may
apply lower tariffs on imports of telecommunications equipment from
Member State territories than they apply to equipment imported from
outside the Community. An equipment producer located within the
EC, therefore, may have a cost advantage over a producer located
outside the EC on the basis of a GATT-authorized measure to promote regional integration. 35 As discussed previously, whether this
preferential tariff arrangement creates global economic welfare benefits
is an open question, but these relatively benign preferences have not to
date appeared to do any great harm, and the elimination of regional
arrangement tariff preferences is not an issue which will be addressed
1 36
in this article.
A recently adopted EC government procurement Directive permits
discrimination in favor of Community-based telecommunications
equipment suppliers.1 37 This type of discrimination is clearly prohibited by the GATT Government Procurement Code, except that the
telecommunications sector is currently not covered by the Code.' 38 A
Commission representative has publicly stated that the local content
discriminations are on the bargaining table at the Uruguay Round negotiations and are part of a "negotiating position."1 3 9 Thus, while
government procurement-related local content discrimination is
135. However, the Community's common external tariff "on the whole" shall not exceed the
bound tariff commitments of the individual member states (if not the "applied" tariff commitments) prior to the formation of the RTA.
136. See Professor Jackson's observation, supra note 89, that, generally speaking, current
global tariff levels no longer present a significant barrier to exporters of goods.
137. Important features of the Directive are that it will apply to private as well as public
entities (e.g., British Telecom and other private TAs would be covered), and that for the telecommunications sector only contracts below 600,000 ECU will be covered. The Community press
release concerning the Directive states:
Special provisions govern the award of supply contracts where the tender involves products originating in third countries with which the Community has not concluded, multilaterally or bilaterally, an agreement ensuring comparable and effective access for Community
undertakings to the markets of those third countries.
These provisions allow, inter alia, for the possibility of rejecting a tender where the proportion of the products manufactured outside the Community in the total value of the manufactured products constituting the tender exceeds 50%. Preference will also be given to the
Community tender if the conditions are equivalent and the price difference does not exceed
3%.
EC Press Release, supra note 119.
138. The Government Procurement Code itself was made necessary (or at least desirable) by
an express exception in the GATT General Agreement provision on National Treatment for
government purchases not with a view toward resale. General Agreement, supra note 4, at art.
lII.8(a).
139. Statement by Anna Snow of the EC Commission Delegation to the United States at
Deloitte & Touche/Admerca Conference in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 28, 1990), reported in 'Local
Content' Restrictions Subject to GATT Discussion, Official Says, 56 TELECOMM. REP. (BRP)
(No. 9) 22 (Mar. 5, 1990).
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anathema to free trade (and the National Treatment principle), the
Commission is within its GATT rights in maintaining such discrimination until the Procurement Code is amended,14° while recognizing
the desirability of negotiating away this discrimination in the Uruguay
Round. The EC's local content discrimination is based not on a special exemption for RTAs, but on a well-recognized gap in GATT coverage which the Uruguay Round will presumably eliminate. The
equipment procurement issue is therefore not of special interest.
D.

Telecommunications Services Liberalization in the EC

The EC is taking steps to ensure that, insofar as the internal market is concerned, there are a minimum of barriers to the cross-border
provision of telecommunications services through, inter alia, the adoption and implementation of the "Council Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications Services through
41
the Implementation of the Open Network Provision ("ONP").'1
The ONP Directive envisages the adoption of harmonized rate structures, usage conditions and technical standards on the Community
level. 142 Its purpose is to create conditions of "open and efficient" access to the public telecommunications network 143 based on conditions
guaranteeing equal and nondiscriminatory access, transparency and
objectivity. 144 Deviations from these conditions will be permitted only
for the essential requirements of security of network operations, maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of services and protection of data. 145 With the implementation of the ONP Directive, valueadded telecommunications service providers will be assured of
equivalent treatment in each of the Member States on conditions
designed to promote the most efficient exchange of data between the
Member States.
The ONP Directive is expressly addressed to affording the benefits
of the completed internal market to enterprises established within the
Community, 46 and explicitly provides that the extension to third140. Except with respect to privatized TAs, over which the Community has no such rights
under the government procurement exemption to the National Treatment principle. See supra
note 126.
141. ONP Directive, supra note 118.
142. Id. at arts. 2(10), 6.
143. Id. at art. 1.
144. Id. at art. 3(1).
145. Id. at art. 3(2).

146. Article 1 of the ONP Directive provides in relevant part:
These conditions are designed to facilitate the provision of services using public telecommunications networks and/or public telecommunications services, within and between Member
States. This includes in particular the provision of services by companies, firms or natural
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country providers of the benefits of the internal market will be dependent on reciprocal market opening.1 4 7 The Directive states a preference for achieving external market opening through multilateral
t4 8
negotiations in the GATT.
The potential adverse impact of the ONP Directive on non-EC
countries largely depends, first, on the extent to which the Community
acts to deprive third-country service suppliers of equivalent access to
the Community telecommunications network. It is, of course, one
thing for the Community to reserve the power to discriminate in favor
of locally-established enterprises and another thing entirely for the
Community to use that power. For example, does the Community actually intend to propose two telecommunications rate structures one applicable to local service enterprises and another applicable to
non-Community service enterprises? To date, there is no indication
that such a bifurcated approach might be taken. Second, the impact of
the Directive will also largely depend on whether the Community
adopts supplemental regulations defining what it considers to be an
enterprise "established in the Community." It is the present perception of the Commission and industry observers that the opening by a
foreign telecommunications enterprise of an office within the territory
of the Community is adequate to constitute "establishment" for purposes of the telecommunications sector.1 49 If this is true and remains
persons established in a Member State of the Community other than that of the company,
firm or natural person for whom the services are intended.
Id. at art. 1(2).
147. Paragraph 28 of the Preamble to the ONP provides:
Whereas the Community attaches major importance to the continued growth of cross-border telecommunications services, to the contribution of telecommunications services provided by companies, firms or natural persons established in a Member State of the
Community to the growth of the Community market, and to the increased participation of
Community service providers in third country markets; whereas it will therefore be necessary, as detailed Directives are elaborated, to ensure that these objectives are taken into
account with a view to reaching a situation where the realization of the more open Community market for telecommunications services will, where appropriate, be accompanied by
reciprocal market opening elsewhere....
Id. at preamble, para. 28.
148. "Whereas this can be achieved preferably through multilateral negotiations in the
framework of GATT, or through bilateral negotiations between the Community and third countries." Id.
149. Interviews with Ms. Alison Berkett, Legal Staff, EC Comm'n DG XIII (June 1990) and
Mr. Steve Billet, Director of Public Affairs, AT&T Europe (June 1990). The Treaty of Rome
(article 58(1)) is generally understood to afford the benefits accruing from the right of establishment to non-EC-based enterprises which show a continuous and effective link with the economy
of a Member State. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, opened for signature
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 40. This standard is not intended to preclude the benefits of the right of establishment from accruing to new companies. A company organized under
the laws of a Member State and with its principal place of business within the Member State
(including a subsidiary of a non-EC company) should, in any event, satisfy the right of establishment requirements of the Treaty of Rome. See Goldstein, 1992 and the FCN and OECD Obligations of EEC Member States to the United States in the FinancialServices Area, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
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so, then the larger players in the telecommunications services sector
will not be affected by discrimination against non-Community providers because large players will not find it burdensome to establish a
presence in the Community. The impact of a de facto establishment
requirement on smaller service suppliers would, of course, be more
significant. 150

The area of potential Community discrimination which is most
troubling to third-country service (as well as equipment) providers appears to involve Community standards-setting activities.15, Outsiders
are concerned that the Community will have the capacity through the
exercise of seemingly "objective" and "scientific" powers to alter the
balance of economic power in favor of local/regional industry, at least
for a period of time long enough to preclude these external suppliers
189, 218-19 (1990). A definition of "service provider of a party" is set forth in the EC Services
Proposal,supra note 8, at art. XXVIII(2) (a). The definition is consistent with the understanding
of the Treaty of Rome requirements disscussed above.
150. There is considerable debate over whether existing FCN treaties between the United
States and individual member countries of the Community effectively bar the Community from
adopting discriminatory or burdensome establishment requirements with respect to U.S. providers. See generally Goldstein, supra note 149, at 218-19.
151. The standards issue affects both equipment and service providers and thus is a hybrid
issue within the GATT framework. In order for a telecommunications equipment or- service
provider to enter the market, the equipment or service must "interconnect" or be compatible
with the network. So-called "connectivity" is not a simple matter. Seven levels at which networks interconnect are:
1. The level at which data in the form of electronic signals are transmitted across physical
circuits;
2. The level at which the system reduces errors in data arising from physical transmission;
3. The level at which electrical signals are routed and transferred to the appropriate processor or other end-system;
4. The level at which data is transferred between processors or other end-systems;
5. The level at which data is coordinated and synchronized;
6. The level at which electrical data signals are manipulated and converted; and
7. The level of human use of application programs, etc.
See ISO seven-layer reference model in Vervest, Standardization as a Government Policy Tool, in
GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 44 (G. Muskens
& J. Gruppelaar eds. 1988).
As any user of a rudimentary word processing program knows, it is not always possible to
perform the seemingly simple task of transferring files between two programs unless they have
each been written to meet particular format standards - and even apparently compatible file
transfers produce garbled results. This compatibility or connectivity problem exists throughout
the telecommunications world where the absence of agreed-upon interface standards hinders the
establishment of networks.
The "connectivity" problem, by and large, has been resolved in so-called "private networks."
A single transnational enterprise and often its major suppliers are connected on a network in
which all of the standards are set by the network provider. There are many examples of such
systems, which are established at great expense. The difficulties arise at the "public" level - that
is, the point at which private networks (or single terminals) attempt to interact with each other,
but where there is an absence of agreed-upon standards. The potential for an international
Tower of Babel clearly exists, with competing private and public networks unable to interconnect
- to the obvious detriment of end users. Participants in the telecommunications industry are
acutely aware of the problem, but strongly disagree as to how it should be resolved.
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from taking advantage of current market leadership. 15 2 By defining
technical interface standards which are not those currently used by
industry leaders - who are, perhaps coincidentally, not EC-based the Commission could force major changes to be implemented in the
equipment and software of foreign suppliers which may take years to
accomplish. Some concern has been expressed that EC-based companies will be given more immediate access to these standards so that
they would have an advantage in implementation. 1 53 Even if this
proves false,154 merely placing competing companies at the same starting line would represent a substantial gain for the EC telecommunications industry because of the lead currently held by its U.S.- and
Japan-based competition. Moreover, if the standards adopted in the
EC are not generally accepted international standards, foreign equipment and service providers will lose some of their economy of scale
advantage.
A major segment of the U.S. telecommunications industry contends that "market-driven" standards-setting is preferable to government (or government-directed) standards-setting. According to this
view, service providers should adopt the standards set by market-leading providers because the development of workable standards has already been accomplished. 155 This approach would obviously favor
current industry-dominant participants, who would have both a lead
in the provision of network services (as well as equipment) and per152. The observation that telecommunications industry participants are perhaps predominantly concerned with the exercise of the EC's standards-setting powers is based on the author's
interviews with various industry officials. The perspective of U.S. industry and government with
respect to EC standards-setting activities is described in Mastromarco, The European Community Approach to Standardization:A Possible Mechanism for Improved Nonmember State Input,
15 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 47, 49-51. Cullen and Defraigne observe:
In the telecommunications field, government imposed standards are used with the stated
intention of protecting the network and more recently, to ensure "interconnectivity" or "interoperability". To what extent all these measures are justified (or consistent with EEC
Treaty rules) is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the economically important
telecommunications field there is an obvious temptation for governments to impose standards for reasons of industrial policy.
Cullen & Defraigne, Political and Economic Aspects of Standards, in LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 106, at 535, 540.

153. The U.S. government has expressed special concern with respect to access to EC standards-setting bodies. See the comments of U.S. Commerce Department Director of EC Affairs,
Charles Ludolph, expressing concern that U.S. telecommunications enterprises could be shut out
of the EC standards-setting process, leading to a two- or three-year delay in acquiring knowledge
of the standards. U.S. Firms Won't Need to Be Located in EC by 1992 to Compete, Commerce
Official Says, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1417 (Oct. 26, 1988).
154. Because U.S. industry representatives are given observer status in ETSI working groups,
companies based in EC countries may not have superior access to interface standards. Interview
with Jan Guettler, Program Director of Telecommunications Practices, IBM Europe (June
1990).
155. On the benefits and costs associated with dominant firms/de facto standards, see Cullen
and Defraigne, supra note 152, at 541-42.
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56
haps be in a position to collect royalties from users of the standards.
The Commission may well take a dim view of the "market-driven"
more apapproach to standards-setting, considering that it might be
57
approach.
actors"
"dominant
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E.

US. and EC Telecommunications Annex Proposals

The draft Telecommunications Annex provisions to the GATT
Services Code proposals of both the United States 5 " and the EC15 9 do
not materially alter the general Services Code proposals. The Annexes
state in greater detail the kinds of entities which will be considered
"public" (e.g., including private providers acting as common carriers)
and indicate that terms of access to the services of these public entities
will be nondiscriminatory. 160 The definition of "reasonable access" in
telecommunications terms is specified: the availability of leased lines at
cost-based, flat rate prices.' 6' There is the widely anticipated provision in each Annex permitting parties to reserve the "basic services"
sectors to public entities (including chartered monopolies), 62 provided
that these basic services are made available in a nondiscriminatory
manner. With respect to standards, the U.S. Annex proposal states
that no party shall require a customer to "use any mandatory or designated standards or protocols, except as such standards and protocols
establish interfaces to public, switched telecommunications transport
networks, or as may be required to prevent technical harm to a public
telecommunications transport network.' 63 The U.S. proposal thus
156. The Commission would probably take the position that if industry-developed standards
were to become the "public" standards, they should be made available on a concessionary basis
(whether this means transferred into the public domain at no cost or provided for a nominal
royalty would remain to be seen). The question of ownership of the new interface standards
looms as one of the major intellectual property issues facing the telecommunications industry.
157. Commission officials note that standards-setting in the U.S. telecommunications industry has historically been accomplished by a few dominant industry enterprises.
158. Communication from the United States, Annex, Access to and Use of Services of Public
Telecommunications TransportServices, GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/W/97 (Mar. 23, 1990) [hereinafter US. Annex].
159. EC Non Paper: Telecommunications Annex to the General Framework on Trade in
Services [hereinafter EC Annex] (draft in author's files). This Annex is not yet released. The
draft in the author's files is incomplete and certain observations may require modification when
the complete draft becomes available.
160. See, e.g., U.S. Annex, supra note 158, at art. 3.3, 3.5.
161. See, e.g., id. at art. 3.5.1. According to the U.S. proposal: " 'Access to public telecommunications transport services' means the ability of a customer of any Party to subscribe on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates, terms and conditions to any such service offered within
or into the territory of the Party." Id. at art. 3.5.
162. The U.S. Annex, for example, is drafted in terms of reserving "public telecommunications transport services" (id. at art. 2.2.2), which are defined as simple information transmission
in real time. Id. at art. 2.1.2 and note 1.
163. Id. at art. 3.7.3.
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envisages that each party will be permitted to adopt its own protocols
for access to its public "basic services" transmission network, but not
to adopt standards for services unrelated to transmission on the public
network. The EC Annex provides that standards may be adopted to
ensure "network security" and "network integrity, particularly with
regard to the normal interworking of all network components and network termination points.' 164 Both of these proposals regarding the
adoption of telecommunications standards should be read in light of
the more general provisos in the U.S. and EC services code proposals
that standards or protocols may not be adopted as a disguised restraint
on trade. 165
F. Evaluating Commission Action under the EC's RTA Waiver
Standard and the "Necessary" Formula
This article has analyzed the EC's proposed standard for evaluating whether an RTA will be justified in witholding the benefits of internal market liberalization from non-RTA parties and suggested that
the formula is unworkable (and unwise). It may now be illustrative to
consider how the EC's waiver formula might work with regard to hypothetical telecommunications sector regulation.
Assume, hypothetically, that in the Services Code telecommunications annex each party agrees to provide non-discriminatory access
(which precludes the charging of discriminatory rates) for the basic
telecommunications transport services of public network operators.
Assume that this agreement does not extend to providing non-discriminatory access to the transmission services of public cellular telephone
networks, which prior to the adoption of the Code are regulated
within the EC on a Member State to Member State basis. Assume,
further, that existing Member State public cellular system regulation
generally permits the adoption of rate structures which discriminate
between enterprises based in the regulating Member State and enterprises not based within that Member State (including EC-based enter164. EC Annex, supra note 159, at art. 8. "Network termination point" is defined as "[a]ll
physical connections and their technical access specifications which form part of the public telecommunications network and are necessary for access to and efficient communications through
that public network." Id. at art. 12.3. It would therefore appear that insofar as technical interface standards are concerned, the EC views its rights as extending beyond the U.S. "no harm to
the network" standard, and into the somewhat more amorphous realm of ensuring efficient communications through the network. This subtle difference may represent an EC inclination toward the recommendation of pan-EC telecommunications standards; yet this subtle semantic
opening would not appear wide enough to justify the adoption of standards inconsistent with
those widely in use and perhaps more objectively supportable.
165. US. Services Proposal,supra note 46, at art. 11.1; EC Services Proposal,supra note 8, at
art. V(3).
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prises not based within the regulating Member State). Consider that
following the adoption of the Services Code, the EC Commission mandates that all public cellular transmission system operators provide
non-discriminatory access to their basic transmission services; but it
extends this mandate only to benefit system users that are based in
Member States. Public cellular network operators in the EC, which
prior to the adoption of the new regulations charged system users different rates depending on whether they were intra-State or external
enterprises, adjust their rate structures to apply uniformly within the
Community (using the old intra-Member rates), leaving the "old" external rates applicable to non-EC Member State enterprises.
Analyzed under the EC waiver formula, the EC cellular telephone
regulations would presumably give rise to a higher degree of liberalization in the Community than was existing prior to their adoption because more competitive conditions in the Community are created, at
least as regards EC Member State enterprises. The EC's higher degree
of liberalization test does not specify that improvements in the Community may not adversely impact enterprises based outside the Community. The resulting "regime" does not appear to be more restrictive
"on the whole" than the Code commitments of each individual Member State, because the Member States did not specifically undertake to
establish National Treatment with respect to public cellular telecommunications transport services in their schedules of commitments and,
moreover, appear not to have made conditions worse for non-Member
State enterprises which remain subject to a previously existing two-tier
structure. The above described hypothetical Community measures
therefore appear to be permitted by the EC's proposed RTA waiver.
Assume, alternatively, that there are no common technical standards for the telecommunications industry in the EC. Assume also
that each Member State of the EC agrees in its schedule to the Services
Code that its adoption of technical standards will be based on objective scientific criteria, using international standards where reasonably
appropriate. Following the adoption of the Code, at the instigation of
the Commission, the European Technical Standards Institute adopts
telecommunications interface standards applicable to all public telecommunications network providers in the Community. Assume that
in doing so it rejects standards widely adopted in the United States
and Japan (and which may generally be considered to be international
standards) on the grounds that a majority of Community-based service
providers deemed these standards incompatible with European scientific objectives in the development of an integrated Community network. In response to objections from the U.S. and Japanese
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governments, the Commission concedes that the international standards would have been adequate, but were nevertheless not wholly
consistent with with its plans for the integration of the Community
telecommunications industry. As a result of the adoption of the new
standards, U.S. and Japanese network service providers must
reprogram all telecommunications-related software to enable it to interconnect with the EC public network. Have the Community and its
Member States derogated from their commitments under the Services
Code?
The action instigated or taken by the Commission appears to be
"liberalizing" from the Commission's standpoint, since prior to the
adoption of new standards there were no standards generally applicable throughout the Community. Intra-Community access to the telecommunications services network is enhanced for EC enterprises
which have not developed their own proprietary standards. Each
Member State will contend that its actions in adopting the new EC
standards are consistent with its Code obligation to adopt international standards where reasonably appropriate and to avoid the unjustifiable adoption of standards as a disguised barrier to trade in services.
There is no readily apparent yardstick for determining whether the
resulting "regime" is more or less restrictive "on the whole" than if
each Member State either pursued its own standards-setting or
adopted alternatively available international standards. Pan-EC standards would in most instances appear to be less restrictive than the
adoption of separate standards by each member country, and it might
be difficult to demonstrate that each Member State should have
adopted a particular international standard. The "on the whole" test
may therefore provide little guidance in this context. Ultimately, it
appears that the RTA waiver formula proposed by the EC will have
little to do with determining whether pan-EC standards are found to
be compatible with the obligations of the EC or its Member States
under the Services Code. That decision will more likely be based on a
determination of whether the EC or its Member States have adopted
standards as a disguised barrier to trade in the context of the substantive rules of the Code.
G. Application of New Formula to the Telecommunications Sector
From the standpoint of non-Member State service providers, the
EC's most important regulatory activities will be undertaken pursuant
to the ONP Directive. On its face, the ONP Directive is inconsistent
with the National Treatment requirement because the benefits of the
Directive are expressly addressed to service providers established
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within the Member States. If the Council and Commission did not
contemplate that the EC Member States would pursue policies which
discriminated in favor of local service providers, they could as easily
have drafted the ONP Directive to address its benefits to services enterprises without qualification. Since the Community can readily extend the benefits of the ONP Directive to enterprises established
within specific trading partners, the reservation of the right to discriminate in the ONP Directive may be perceived by the EC as a bargaining chip in the Uruguay Round negotiations, or as a long-term
discrimination tradeable in reciprocity negotiations. It is assumed by
both the United States and the EC that the GATT Services Code will
not be adhered to by all GATT members, so the retention by the EC
of its discriminatory legislation will not be contrary to its GATT obligations and may, after a Services Code is agreed upon, be amended to
reflect its accomodation to parties to the Code. Only by maintenance
of its discriminatory characteristics vis-A-vis parties to a GATT Services Code would such EC legislation be subject to evaluation under the
test of necessity.
The two hypothetical cases of prospective EC discrimination
against non-Member State service providers that were previously considered under the EC's proposed waiver formula might now be examined under the test of necessity.
The adoption by the EC and its Member States of a cellular telephone transmission regulatory structure which maintains rate discrimination as between Member States and third-country providers would
not easily be justified as necessary to the formation or maintenance of
the EC. A contention that discriminatory rates based on the nationality of service providers (or the country of origin of services) are necessary to the financial viability of the completed internal cellular
network would be easily countered by the observation that rates necessary to establish or maintain the network could just as easily be spread
over all users of the system regardless of national origin. If the Community could demonstrate that certain costs were incurred only in the
provision of access to users based outside the Community, a surcharge
might be justified, but the likelihood of such a cost differential appears
remote. 66 Furthermore, discriminatory access charges based on the
nationality of the service provider (or country of origin) are unlikely to
166. It may well be that electrical impulses will have certain "national" characteristics, in the
form of different technical interface characteristics, if international standards are not adopted.
However, if the EC's standards are different from international standards, foreign users of the EC
network will doubtless have to convert their signals to interface with the EC network. It is
therefore highly unlikely that any cost differential based on foreign access to the system could be
justified.
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be supportable for reasons relating to establishing political institutions,
maintaining regional security, providing assistance to impoverished regions or as a safeguard measure.
Evaluation of the adoption of "discriminatory" intra-EC telecommunications standards is likely to be more problematic. In the first
place, the EC certainly has the inherent right to adopt (or cause the
adoption of) telecommunications standards in order to assure the public welfare and protect regional security interests. The absence of established standards might seriously interfere with the provision of vital
government services, in addition to harming the less compelling interests of the private sector. The more difficult question is whether, and
to what extent, the Commission should be entitled to ignore existing
"market-driven" standards and adopt pan-EC standards developed by
ETSI. To some extent, resolution of this issue may depend on the
attitude of foreign market players. Currently, many telecommunications network standards are owned by private sector entities. Refusal
by these entities to make their standards available to the public at a
nominal price might in itself justify the Community in adopting regionally developed standards, because the Community should be
under no obligation to adopt regulations which would require local
enterprises to make significant payments to private business enterprises, either local or foreign.
Suppose, however, that foreign private industry offered to make its
proprietary standards publicly available at nominal cost. If ETSI
then elected to adopt pan-EC standards which were not justifiable as a
technical advancement over standards widely adopted and available in
the private market, the adoption of such standards would not be "necessary" and might well represent a disguised barrier to the market advantages of foreign service providers.
The adoption of technical standards by the EC is likely to become
mired in controversy over the "scientific" merits of ETSI technical
advances, and even the most sophisticated GATT panel might well
have trouble sorting fact from fiction. In these circumstances, the
scales of trade justice would be forced to tip either in favor of the
inherent right of government to regulate or the promotion of open
markets. The right of government to regulate is likely to have the
advantage in such a balancing test, if for no other reason than the fact
that the balancing test would ultimately be performed by government
regulators.
Adopting "necessity" as the test for an RTA waiver from the National Treatment principle and other GATT rules will not provide a
ready answer for all questions of whether or not a derogation is appro-
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priate. In the limited context of considering two prospective EC derogations, one set of facts may seem to present a "bright line" answer
and the other a close question. Because the political nature of the
GATT favors compromise, close questions are likely to be resolved in
favor of taking no action - i.e., in permitting derogation to take place.
A formula based on a flexible concept like "necessity" will not be satisfactory to parties looking for clear-cut answers. On the other hand,
analyzing barriers to trade in services is no simple matter, and a seemingly simple objective test of permissible RTA derogations that places
no meaningful limitation on discriminatory regulations and is unworkable in practice will not promote peaceful coexistence between the
GATT and RTAs. A subjective test, allowing GATT parties to weigh
competing interests, is most appropriate in these circumstances. What
must be clear, however, is that RTA derogations from the rules generally applicable in the GATT should be limited to those which are indispensable to the formation or maintenance of an RTA, and that are,
to the maximum extent feasible, limited in duration. A more liberal
standard would threaten to undermine the foundation of the GATT.
CONCLUSION

Political leaders appear to be wedded to the concept of regional
economic integration. Agreements to lower regional trade barriers
provide an easy and highly visible answer to economic problems. Regional arrangements such as the EC provide political and military stability which may outweigh all but the most severely adverse economic
effects they create for non-RTA members. Nevertheless, while such
arrangements may accelerate development on a regional basis, yield
political benefits and provide models for future global economic institutions, they also pose risks to the liberal global trading system.
RTA discriminations in new areas such as services will create effects which are presently incapable of measurement. As such discriminations will be continuing measures based on the nationality of service
providers as opposed to one-time border measures, their effect is likely
to be greater than that of border measures (e.g., tariffs). Such measures should be limited to the extent feasible in order to prevent the
global trading system from reverting to a reliance on bilateral reciprocity determinations. Narrow reciprocity as a basis for trade liberalization is inimical to the most fundamental principles of the GATT,
such as Most Favored Nation and National Treatment, which appear
to have played a substantial role in the expansion of world trade in the
late twentieth century. This article proposes a formula for evaluating
RTA discriminations which should minimize their use.

58

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 12:1

Liberalization of trade within regional groups without extending
the benefits of this activity to the global trading system as a whole
would reflect a movement toward isolationism and protectionism both of which tendencies have had ill effect when practiced on a national level. Regional liberalization as a transition to global liberalization may produce certain economic benefits and may aid in the
development of valuable "prototype" trading systems. Regional development, particularly in the industrialized countries, must not be allowed to become a substitute for global development. It is in the
enlightened self-interest of the industrialized countries to aggressively
promote economic development throughout the world. Regional systems narrowly promoting local interests should not become substitutes
for national policies of protectionism. Regional preferences in "new
areas" of trade regulation should be adopted and implemented with
the greatest restraint.

